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ABSTRAC T. A half-century ago, author and physicist C.P. Snow warned of a "gulf of mutual
incomprehension" between the liberal arts and sciences. Snow's "Two Cultures" thesis is
particularly relevant to patent law, a realm where law and science intersect. Drawing on Snow's
framework, this Article addresses challenges that arise when lay judges must engage,
understand, and ultimately pass judgment on complex technologies. It first argues that
technological subject matter imposes significant cognitive burdens on generalist judges. It then
explores the "cognitive miser" model whereby laypersons adopt heuristics and defer to expertise
to mitigate these burdens. Drawing from this psychological model, the Article then explores the
unique role of formalism in patent doctrine. Advancing an information-cost theory of Federal
Circuit jurisprudence, it argues that formalism limits and streamlines judicial engagement with
technology. Formalism truncates difficult technical inquiries, thus helping to mediate the
intersection of law and science. The Article then identifies a countervailing trend in recent
Supreme Court patent decisions. In addition to substantively narrowing patent rights, the Court
is systematically rejecting formalistic rules in favor of holistic standards. This so-called holistic
turn promises to increase judicial engagement with technology. To address resulting cognitive
burdens, this Article offers prescriptions for blending the economizing virtues of rules with the
flexibility and contextual sensitivity of standards. It concludes by exploring the cultural
differences of the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court as well as the implications of those
differences for patent doctrine.
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"Patent litigation is like the neurosurgery of litigation: it is hard
scientifically and it is hard legally."'
INTRODUCTION
The Hon. James F. Holderman, Chief Judge of the Northern District of
Illinois, sees a fair number of patent cases. As such, he is no stranger to
advanced technologies, having presided over cases involving wireless portable
communication devices,' anti-theft systems,' and wavelength division
multiplexed optical communication systems. 4 Recently, he had this to say
about patent disputes:
Patent litigation is different . ... It is more complicated, more time-
consuming and more mentally taxing because typically the patent being
litigated is a successful advancement of some science or technology. So,
the judge has to understand that background just to get to the factual
basis of the problem and then deal with legal aspects.'
These challenges form the subject of this Article.
As a general matter, lawyers and science don't mix.6 This fact of legal life
reflects a broader epistemological schism best captured in an influential 1959
lecture by C.P. Snow, entitled "The Two Cultures."' By invoking "culture,"
Snow did not refer to ethnic, religious, or national groups. Rather, he sought
to describe a deep intellectual divide between literary and scientific cultures.
1. Kathleen M. O'Malley, Patti Saris & Ronald H. Whyte, A Panel Discussion: Claim
Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 671, 682 (2004)
(statement of Hon. Patti Saris).
2. Intellect Wireless, Inc. v. Kyocera Commc'ns, Inc., No. o8 C 1350, 2009 WVL 3259996 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 8, 2009).
3. Se-Kure Controls, Inc. v. Sennco Solutions, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d 877 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
4. Tellabs Operations, Inc. v. Fujitsu Ltd., No. o8 C 3379, 2009 WL 1329153 (N.D. Ill. May 13,
2009).
5. Rachel M. Zahorsky, Patent Pending, A.B.A. J., Jan. 20o, at II (statement of Hon. James F.
Holderman).
6. CARNEGIE COMM'N ON SCI., TECH. & Gov'T, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN JUDICIAL
DECISION MAKING: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES AND MEETING CHALLENGES 19 (1993)
[hereinafter CARNEGIE COMM'N] ("At the moment, the parallel paths of scientists and
lawyers usually obey the rules of Euclidean geometry -they do not intersect -even though
both disciplines not infrequently ponder the same subjects. And when their paths do cross,
the result is often misunderstanding, rather than constructive communication.").
7. C.P. SNow, THE TWO CULTURES (Canto ed. 1998).
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Reflecting on his background as an author and physicist, he warned of a
dangerous "gulf of mutual incomprehension" between the liberal arts and
sciences. Although Snow's remarks arose within a particular social and
historical context,' his thesis has become an enduring metaphor for the
challenges of intellectual specialization,"o and I invoke it here in this sense.
Snow's dichotomy is, of course, a gross generalization." But in its stark duality,
the "Two Cultures" captures an anxiety readily apparent to many lawyers when
confronting scientific complexity." While Snow did not directly address patent
law, his metaphor is highly salient to the patent system-a realm where law and
science intersect.' 3
Drawing on the "Two Cultures," this Article explores challenges that arise
when lay judges must engage, understand, and ultimately pass judgment on
complex technologies. Much patent scholarship focuses on the important
8. Id. at 4.
9. Snow, a British citizen, was largely critiquing the compartmentalized nature of postwar
British education. Stefan Collini, Introduction to SNOW, supra note 7, at vii, xvi-xvul;
Benjamin R. Cohen, Science and Humanities: Across Two Cultures and into Science Studies, 25
ENDEAVOUR 8, 8 (2001).
1o. See Collini, supra note 9, at lxi-lxxi.
ii. Snow acknowledged the reductionist character of his thesis. SNOW, supra note 7, at 9. But see
Cynthia M. Pyle, The Two Cultures and Renaissance Humanism, 33 INTERDISC. Sct. REVS. 121,
129 (2008) (suggesting that conceptual dichotomies "may well be fundamental to human
thought"). Clearly, there is not one scientific culture, but many; the theoretical physicist may
feel quite removed from the field biologist. Furthermore, scientific and technological
cultures are distinct, as academic scientists may share little in common with garage
inventors. But see SNow, supra note 7, at 67. Similarly, there is a vast array of "literary
intellectuals," and much of social science straddles the literary and scientific realms. Pyle,
supra, at 122, 125-27 (noting that "[a] number of recent studies have implied that the so-
called 'social sciences' . . . are the logical bridge between the humanities and the sciences").
For additional criticisms of the "Two Cultures" thesis, see Cohen, supra note 9, at 11; Jos6
van Dijck, After the "Two Cultures": Toward a "(Multi)cultural" Practice of Science
Communication, 25 ScI. COMM. 177 (2003); and John Hultberg, The Two Cultures Revisited, 18
SCI. COMM. 194, 206-07 (1997). My aim is not to categorically defend Snow's thesis, but to
apply it as a helpful (but contested) lens for viewing the patent system.
12. Cf SNOW, supra note 7, at 22 ("Intellectuals, in particular literary intellectuals, are natural
Luddites.").
13. Cf Sheila Jasanoff, Law's Knowledge: Science for Justice in Legal Settings, 95 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH S49, S51 (Supp. 1 2005) (characterizing law and science as "clashing cultures"). It
bears emphasizing that the foils to Snow's scientists were not lawyers per se, but a broader
class of "literary intellectuals." Nevertheless, the cultural split between literary and scientific
intellectuals that Snow describes is one that patent law must try to reconcile.
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question of how to structure exclusive rights to maximize innovation."4
However, this Article takes a different approach, building on a rich literature
addressing the institutional dimensions of patent adjudication, which are
critical to a well-functioning patent system." It proceeds on the premise that
no matter how elegantly policymakers craft patent law, if generalist judges lack
the capacity to administer it, the patent system cannot fulfill its objectives. In
so doing, this Article sheds new light on the ways in which doctrine can
mediate (and complicate) the intersection of legal and scientific cultures.
The Article proceeds in six parts. Part I argues that patented technologies
impose significant cognitive burdens on lay actors - particularly district
14. Examples are too numerous to mention, but representative works include JAMES BESSEN &
MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT
INNOVATORS AT RISK (2oo8); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989); Mark A. Lemley, The
Economics ofImprovement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997); and Robert
P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 839 (1990).
15. See, e.g., Donald S. Chisum, Lecture, The Supreme Court and Patent Law: Does Shallow
Reasoning Lead to Thin Law?, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (1999); Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989)
[hereinafter Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit]; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A
Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769 (2004) [hereinafter
Dreyfuss, Continuing Experiment]; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional
Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787 (2008) [hereinafter
Dreyfuss, Institutional Identity]; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Lecture, What the Federal Circuit
Can Learn from the Supreme Court-And Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787 (2010) [hereinafter
Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn]; John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the
Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar ofPatents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273; John M. Golden,
The Supreme Court as "Prime Percolator": A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in
Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657 (2009); Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible
Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387; Craig Allen Nard, Toward a Cautious Approach to
Obeisance: The Role of Scholarship in Federal Circuit Patent Law Jurisprudence, 39 Hous. L.
REV. 667 (2002); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to
Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the
Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771 (2003); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the
Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment ofJudicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1105 (2004).
16. This intersection has been the subject of extensive academic commentary ranging well
beyond patent law. See, e.g., STEVEN GOLDBERG, CULTURE CLASH: LAW AND SCIENCE IN
AMERICA (1994); SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY
IN AMERICA (1997); Harold P. Green, The Law-Science Interface in Public Policy
Decisionmaking, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 375 (1990); Robert P. Merges, The Nature and Necessity of
Law and Science, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 315 (1988); Peter H. Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux:
Science, Law, and Politics, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (1993); Milton R. Wessel, Adversary
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judges- in the patent system. 7 Many judges doubt their ability to comprehend
the patented inventions before them. Patent commentators and empirical
studies suggest that this anxiety is well founded. Policymakers and scholars
have proposed a number of mechanisms to address the cognitive demands of
patent adjudication, but none is entirely satisfactory.
Part II exploits an underutilized resource for understanding the difficulties
of patent adjudication: the psychology of technological engagement. Surveying
the psychological literature, this Part first confirms that complex technologies
impose significant cognitive burdens on lay individuals. It goes on to examine
variants of the "cognitive miser" model wherein individuals adopt heuristics
and defer to expert opinion to reduce information costs associated with
technological engagement.
Part III draws from these psychological findings to offer an information-
cost theory of Federal Circuit patent doctrine." Scholars have long recognized
that Federal Circuit patent doctrine is highly formalistic." This Part goes
further to explore how formalism mediates technological engagement by
generalist judges. Examining several areas of patent doctrine, I argue that
formalism is an inherently "inquiry-truncating" methodology that reduces the
degree to which lay judges must engage with technological subject matter.
Thus, for example, the Federal Circuit's historically formalistic approach to
nonobviousness helped delimit and streamline potentially expansive inquiries
into patented inventions. In this sense, formalism allows judges to operate as
cognitive misers.
Part IV then reveals an undertheorized, countervailing trend in recent
Supreme Court patent decisions. Starting about a decade and a half ago, the
Supreme Court has more aggressively asserted its appellate jurisdiction over
the Federal Circuit, reversing several significant lines of precedent. Scholars
have rightly highlighted the important substantive impact of these decisions,
which tend to constrain patent rights. However, I argue that recent Supreme
Court decisions also exhibit a significant and less noticed methodological shift.
In short, the Court is systematically favoring "holistic" standards over
formalistic rules in a variety of areas of patent doctrine. These information-
demanding standards tend to enhance the degree to which district judges must
grapple with technological context.
17. I focus on judges because of their centrality to patent adjudication. While much of this
Article's psychological analysis applies as well to jurors, their unique role in patent litigation
warrants separate treatment.
1s. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is a quasi-specialized court that hears appeals
in patent matters. See infra notes 126-131 and accompanying text.
ig. See infra note 132.
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Part V examines the implications of the Supreme Court's holistic turn. It
first observes that Supreme Court opinions impose high information-cost
externalities on district judges. It then explores how the Court can do more to
internalize some of those externalities. Drawing from foundational concepts in
patent law itself, this Article proposes applying "enablement" principles to
Supreme Court patent opinions. By considering and "internalizing" the
difficulties of technological engagement, the Supreme Court can produce
doctrine that is clearer, more bounded, and easier to apply.
Part VI concludes by examining the cultural differences of the Federal
Circuit and the Supreme Court. Returning to the theme of the "Two
Cultures," it argues that Federal Circuit formalism arises in significant part
from that court's specialized authority over patent law and its day-to-day
proximity to patent litigation. It further argues that Supreme Court holism
stems from the Court's generalist outlook and its relative insulation from the
complexities of technology and patent adjudication.
This Article seeks to make several contributions. It provides novel
descriptive theories for longstanding Federal Circuit jurisprudence as well as
the Supreme Court's recent forays into patent law. Applying an information-
cost analysis, it offers prescriptions for drafting Supreme Court opinions that
will improve the administration of patent law. In a broader sense, this Article
argues for pluralizing the resources brought to bear on patent scholarship.
While such scholarship has profited handsomely from law and economics and
empirical studies,2 o this Article shows that academic inquiries into the
psychology and sociology of science can illuminate many features of the legal
architecture of innovation.2" While the "objective" natures of science and patent
20. See Nard, supra note 15, at 669 & n.9.
21. Cf Martha Minow, Law Turning Outward, TELOS, Fall 1987, at 79, 79 ("Given the
interdisciplinary trends, legal analysis no longer appears to have a distinctive method
removed from politics, social science, and humanities."). For example, sociologies of science
have been particularly helpful in revealing communal sharing norms that discourage
individual property rights in research discoveries. See, e.g., BERNARD BARBER, SCIENCE AND
THE SOCIAL ORDER (1952); WARREN 0. HAGSTROM, THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY (1965);
ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
INVESTIGATIONS 275 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973). Patent scholars have drawn upon these
accounts to challenge the propriety of exclusive rights on research technologies. See, e.g.,
Eisenberg, supra note 14; Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The
Case of Scientific Research, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, June 1996, at 145 (1996); Arti Kaur Rai,
Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U.
L. REV. 77 (1999); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent
Doctrine, 79 U. COLo. L. REv. 467 (2008). However, these accounts have not gone
uncontested. See F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and
the Norms of Science-A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 691 (2001).
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doctrine seem to resist cultural analysis, this Article insists that cultural
concerns pervade the realms of science, technology, and patent adjudication.
While this Article focuses on patent law, its analyses extend to the ever-
growing intersection of law and science." As Justice Breyer has noted,
"LS]ociety is becoming more dependent for its well-being on scientifically
complex technology, so, to an increasing degree, this technology underlies legal
issues of importance to all of us." 3 The role of legal doctrine - and particularly,
formalism -in managing cognitive burdens has ramifications for a host of legal
fields, including biomedical ethics, toxic torts, environmental law, and
scientific evidence.' This study in patent law thus provides a
compartmentalized forum for exploring issues of relevance to the wider legal
and technological communities.
1. TECHNOLOGY AND COGNITIVE BURDENS IN THE PATENT
SYSTEM
A. Generalist Judges and Technological Anxiety
The intersection of law and science is fraught with anxiety. Judge William
Schwarzer, speaking generally about scientific evidence, states:
The context in which [science and technology issues] arise varies
widely, but generally they share one characteristic: They challenge the
ability of judges and juries to comprehend the issues - and the
evidence -and to deal with them in informed and effective ways. As a
result, they tend to complicate the litigation, increase expense and
delay, and jeopardize the quality of judicial and jury decision making.
Similarly, the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government
has noted "widespread allegations that the judicial system is increasingly
22. See Anne M. Corbin & Steven B. Dow, Breaking the Cycle: Scientific Discourse in Legal
Education, 26 TEMP. J. SC. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 191, 191 (2007).
23. Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, 280 SCIENCE 537, 537 (1998).
24. See CARNEGIE COMM'N, supra note 6, at 11-12; Jim Chen, Panegyric, The Midas Touch, 7
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH., at i, ii (2005); see also Margaret Bull Kovera & Bradley D. McAuliff,
The Effects ofPeer Review and Evidence Quality on judge Evaluations ofPsychological Science: Are
Judges Effective Gatekeepers?, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 574, 574 (2ooo) (noting challenges
inherent to judicial evaluation of scientific evidence).
25. William W Schwarzer, Introduction to FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 1, 1 (1st ed. 1994).
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unable to manage and adjudicate science and technology (S&T) issues. ,,6 In a
famous case involving the unauthorized commercialization of a patient's spleen
cells, Justice Mosk of the California Supreme Court questioned the court's
ability to understand the medical facts at hand." Judge Thomas Penfield
Jackson felt ill equipped to understand the technical details of the Microsoft
antitrust case over which he presided a decade ago. More recently, Justice
Scalia scoffed at subtleties of atmospheric science in an important case
involving global warming.29
These examples, culled from scientific evidence, medical research, antitrust,
and environmental law, reveal challenges inherent to the intersection of law
and science.3o These challenges are exacerbated by educational specialization;
fewer than ten percent of law students have undergraduate degrees in math,
science, or engineering," and there is little reason to believe that this
proportion is higher among generalist judges.32 These challenges, moreover,
26. CARNEGIE COMM'N, supra note 6, at ii.
27. According to Justice Mosk,
As far as I know, no member of this court is trained as a molecular biologist, or
even as a physician; without expert testimony in the record, therefore, the
majority are not competent to explain these arcane points of medical science any
more than a doctor would be competent to explain esoteric questions of the law of
negotiable instruments or federal income taxation, or the rule against
perpetuities.
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 522 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
28. Michael Brick, When the Judge Can't Really Judge: Business Technology Cases Raise Issues of
Competence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2000, at C4.
29. Oral argument in Massachusetts v. EPA included the following exchange:
MR. MILKEY: Respectfully, Your Honor, it is not the stratosphere. It's the
troposphere.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Troposphere, whatever. I told you before I'm not a scientist.
(Laughter.)
JUSTICE SCALA: That's why I don't want to have to deal with global warming, to
tell you the truth.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 22-23, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-
112o).
30. Several states have considered introducing specialized courts to focus on technologically
complex cases. See, e.g., WILBUR D. PRESTON, JR. ET AL., MARYLAND BUSINESS AND
TECHNOLOGY COURT TASK FORCE REPORT (2000), http://www.courts.state.md.us/
finalb&treport.pdf.
31. DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW 53-54
(1999).
32. Cf Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey ofJudges on Judging
Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 441-42 (2001) (finding
10
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are particularly acute in patent litigation, where lay judges handle cases
involving highly complex technologies." As Justice Breyer observes, "Patent
law cases can turn almost entirely on an understanding of the underlying
technical or scientific subject matter."" This Part focuses on the unique
challenges facing generalist judges who adjudicate patent cases.3s
Anxiety over lay adjudication of patent disputes goes to the very origins of
the U.S. patent system. Thomas Jefferson, a leading architect of that system,
once observed that for judges, the task of determining the validity of a patent
"is but little analogous to their course of reading, since we might in vain turn
over all the lubberly volumes of the law to find a single ray which would
lighten the path of the Mechanic or Mathematician."36
Since that time, judges have frequently doubted their own ability to
adjudicate patent cases. In a case involving extracted and purified adrenaline,
the venerable Judge Learned Hand famously remarked, "I cannot stop without
calling attention to the extraordinary condition of the law which makes it
possible for a man without any knowledge of even the rudiments of chemistry
to pass upon such questions as these."" Recently, a district court judge ruling
that forty-eight percent of four hundred state court judges believed their education left them
inadequately prepared to handle the range of scientific evidence arising in their
courtrooms); id. at 451-53 (concluding that survey results suggest "limitations in the
judiciary's understanding of science"); Kovera & McAuliff, supra note 24, at 578-79
(reporting that eighteen percent of 144 Florida judges surveyed had an undergraduate
degree in "the natural sciences or psychology"). By comparison, considering only academic
degrees conferred, it appears that at least seven out of fifteen judges of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit have an educational background in science or engineering. See Judicial
Biographies, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov (follow "Judges"
hyperlink under "The Court") (last visited Sept. 6, 2010).
33. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), a specialized administrative agency, processes
patent applications. However, once the PTO has granted a patent, parties generally rely on
district courts to enforce their rights, either by suing another party for infringement or
seeking a judicial declaration of patent invalidity or noninfringement.
34. Stephen Breyer, Introduction to FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 1,3 (2d ed. 2000); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, A More Complete Look at Complexity,
40 ARIz. L. REV. 781, 794 (1998) (noting the factually complex nature of patent infringement
suits).
3S. See Rai, supra note 15, at 1040 ("Generalist trial judges, and the juries empanelled by trial
judges, may be overwhelmed by the technology involved in patent cases.").
36. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON: RETIREMENT SERIES 379, 384 (J. Jefferson Looney ed., 2009).
37. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912). Tellingly, Judge Hand believed that specialized
adjudicators were better equipped than generalist judges to handle technologically
complicated disputes. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit, supra note 15, at 2.
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on the patentability of genes echoed these same sentiments.3' Trial courts must
frequently rely on experts to learn complex new technologies." According to
Judge Patti Saris of the District of Massachusetts, "[T]rial judges claim that
they dislike patent litigation, partly because it is hard."40 Even Supreme Court
Justices have recognized the unique challenges of patent adjudication."1
In many respects, the complexities of patent doctrine itself, which is rather
arcane, exacerbate judicial engagement with technology." For example, the
patent concept of nonobviousness is particularly hard to grasp. This
requirement holds that an invention must not have been obvious to a "person
having ordinary skill in the art" (PHOSITA) at the time of invention in order
to qualify for a patent.43 The statutory standard is explicitly framed relative to a
technical artisan, not a reasonable person or a legally trained judge." Referring
to "originality," a historical precursor to nonobviousness, Justice Frankfurter
38. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010
VJL 1233416, at *39 n.46 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010) ("This author, confronted by genomics
and molecular biology, also emphatically empathizes with Judge Hand's complaint in Parke-
Davis about his lack of knowledge of the rudiments of chemistry.").
39. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (in banc) (Rader, J.,
dissenting in part, concurring in the judgment, and joining in part).
40. O'Malley et al., supra note i, at 682 (statement of Hon. Patti Saris).
41. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 331 (1971)
("[P]atent litigation can present issues so complex that legal minds, without appropriate
grounding in science and technology, may have difficulty in reaching decision."); Marconi
Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 6o-61 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in
part) ("It is an old observation that the training of Anglo-American judges ill fits them to
discharge the duties cast upon them by patent legislation."); Tony Dutra, Michel Gives Final
'State of the Court' Report, Roberts Calls IP Cases 'Challenging,' 80 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1968, at 119, 119 (May 28, 2010) ("My colleagues and I feel very
fortunate that the Federal Circuit stands between us and those difficult [patent] disputes.")
(statement of Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.).
42. Cf Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, Part II, 24
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 159, 16o (1942) (" [F]ederal judges ... almost invariably ascend the bench
with no knowledge of the patent law they must administer.").
43. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). This difficulty is compounded by varying levels of skill in various
arts. According to Federal Circuit jurisprudence, biotechnology is an "unpredictable" art
while computer science is apparently "predictable." See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is
Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1157 (2002).
44. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 43, at 1196 ("[J]udges are at a rather serious disadvantage in
trying to put themselves in the shoes of an ordinarily skilled scientist."); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 887 (2004); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped
To Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARv. J.L. & TECH, 1, 6 (2001); cf Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert
Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, o7 YALE L.J. 1535, 1551-52 (1998) (questioning the
ability of generalist judges to evaluate scientific evidence).
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remarked that "so long as the Congress . . . makes the determination of
originality a judicial function, judges must overcome their scientific
incompetence as best they can."14 The canonical case interpreting the modern
nonobviousness requirement, Graham v. John Deere Co., also notes the
difficulties of adjudicating nonobviousness. 6 While the subject matter of
patent cases is often technologically complex, patent doctrine itself renders this
a particularly difficult area of law to apply."
Commentators have also questioned the ability of generalist judges to
understand patented technologies.41 One study conducted by then-Professor
Kimberly Moore (now a Federal Circuit judge) focused on claim construction,
the process by which judges interpret the claims that define the scope of a
patented invention. 9 It found that "district court judges improperly construe
patent claim terms in 33% of the cases appealed to the Federal Circuit.""o
Because of those errors, 81% of those decisions were reversed or vacated." In a
follow-up study, Professor Moore found that the reversal rate for appealed
claim terms from 1996 to 2003 was 34.5%." Of course, improper claim
construction may arise from a number of factors besides poor comprehension
of technology. Federal Circuit reversals may reflect vagaries in the law of claim
construction or poor drafting by patent attorneys. Nevertheless, the high
reversal rate "creates doubt about the abilities of district court judges to
45. Marconi Wireless Tel. Co., 320 U.S. at 61 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part).
46. 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966).
47. Professor Arti Rai's observations on patent examination by the PTO are equally applicable
to courts: "Proper evaluation requires understanding not only the science in the area in
which the patent is sought but also the manner in which the patent statute applies to the
science." Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Ojfice's Troubled
Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2052 (2009).
48. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn, supra note 15, at 797; John Shepard
Wiley Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 183 (1991) ("Patent law's
technological focus is forbidding to most lawyers and judges.").
49. Moore, supra note 44; see 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 (2006).
5o. Moore, supra note 44, at 2. Moore assumes that Federal Circuit claim constructions are
"correct," which she acknowledges is not always the case. Id. at 17-21. However, while the
Federal Circuit exhibits some inconsistencies in its claim constructions, Moore reasonably
concludes that high reversal rates suggest that district courts are incorrectly interpreting a
significant proportion of claims. Id.
51. Id. at 2.
52. Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9
LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233 (2oo5). The reversal rate for means-plus-function claims,
which tend to be more technical, is even higher at 39.3%. Id. at 242.
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adjudicate complex technical patent cases."" Professor David Schwartz has
extensively studied district court claim construction and found no evidence that
increased experience by judges significantly improves outcomes."
A brief foray into copyright law further illustrates the difficulties posed by
technological subject matter. Like patent law, copyright law requires judges to
draw difficult lines between protectable and nonprotectable subject matter.
The most notorious of these distinctions is the idea/expression dichotomy," by
which copyright protection only extends to the particularized "expression" of a
work (and minor variations of it) and not to general "ideas."" The principal
expositor of the idea/expression dichotomy, Judge Learned Hand, fully
acknowledged that the test is inherently arbitrary." Nevertheless, he felt
comfortable drawing such distinctions, "evidently regard[ing] himself as 'a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains."'ss
As Professor John Shepard Wiley argues, "These confident judgments bespeak
both familiarity with literary tradition and the judge's faith in his own powers
of literary analysis."" While difficult line drawing is intrinsic to adjudication,
53. Moore, supra note 44, at 3; see also Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's
Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1106 (2001) (suggesting that
difficulties associated with lay understanding of technology contribute to high claim
construction reversal rates); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 15, at 1127 ("[A] high
reversal rate could indicate that nonspecialized district courts are simply unsuited to the
often complex technological task of claim construction.").
54. David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal
Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008). However, in certain areas of patent
litigation outside of claim construction, empirical evidence suggests that specialized
experience by district judges decreases the probability of reversal on appeal. Jay P. Kesan &
Gwendolyn G. Ball, The Impact of General and Patent-Specific Judicial Experience on the
Efficiency and Accuracy of Patent Adjudication (Ill. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series,
Research Paper No. LEio-oo6, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1596308.
55. See Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1221, 1222 (1993); Wiley, supra note 48, at 121; Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment
Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and
Feel,"38 EMoRY L.J. 393, 403 (1989).
56. Kurtz, supra note 55. Thus, for example, Shakespeare could have copyrighted the text of
Romeo and juliet but not the general idea of a romance between star-crossed lovers.
s. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cit. 1930); see also Nash v. CBS,
Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that Judge Hand's test is "not a 'test' at all"
but rather "a clever way to pose the difficulties that .... does little to help resolve a given
case").
58. Wiley, supra note 48, at 161.
59. Id. at 162.
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judges are more comfortable doing so when the relevant subject matter-
literary texts -hews closer to the familiar realm of legal analysis.6 o
However, even within copyright, technical complexity poses special
challenges for lay judges. While copyright traditionally covers books,
paintings, and other familiar media, extending copyright protection to
software 6, introduced palpable discomfort for courts. Software has strained
existing copyright doctrines, such as the substantial similarity test for
determining improper appropriation in an infringement action.62 Arnstein v.
Porter, a case involving sound recordings by Cole Porter, articulates the general
rule that factfinders should determine the substantial similarity of protected
and allegedly infringing works from the perspective of the ordinary layperson,
without the benefit of expert testimony.6 ' However, in Computer Associates v.
Altai, the Second Circuit allowed expert testimony to inform the substantial
similarity determination for copyrighted software.* In doing so, it noted "the
reality that computer programs are likely to be somewhat impenetrable by lay
observers-whether they be judges or juries-and, thus, seem to fall outside
the category of works contemplated by those who engineered the Arnstein
test."6 s Even in the copyright realm, technological complexity challenges
generalist courts.
60. Of course, this is a claim about copyright jurists' comfort with line-drawing, not necessarily
their accuracy. In the absence of objective standards, it is difficult to assess the accuracy of
judicial application of the idea/expression dichotomy and related doctrines.
61. See NAT'L COMM'N ON NEw TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT
(1978).
62. Traditionally, infringement analysis consists of two prongs: (i) determining whether the
defendant copied from the plaintiff, and (2) if so, whether the copying constitutes improper
appropriation. ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 524 (5th ed. 2010). In most contexts, improper
appropriation is found where there is "substantial similarity" between the copied material
and the plaintiffs protected expression. Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F. 3d
70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997); MERGES ET AL., supra, at 524.
63. 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
64. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
65. Id. at 713.
66. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F. 3 d 1435, 1442-43, 1445 (9th Cir. 1994);
Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F. 3d 823, 834 (ioth Cir. 1993); Computer Assocs.
Int'l, 982 F.2d at 696 ("As scientific knowledge advances, courts endeavor to keep pace, and
sometimes-as in the area of computer technology-they are required to venture into less
than familiar waters."); Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the
Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 50 (2001); see also Anthony L. Clapes, Confessions of an
Amicus Curiae: Technophobia, Law, and Creativity in the Digital Arts, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV.
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Of course, any suggestion that lay judges routinely misunderstand complex
technologies must be taken with a grain of salt. Many district judges are quite
comfortable with scientific subject matter. Returning to patent law, forum
shopping and regional differences have produced a highly uneven distribution
of patent litigation around the country." Therefore, some districts have
developed significant expertise in patent cases, and judges there may be well
versed in cutting-edge technologies. However, the "average" district judge
receives only a few patent cases per year and handles a patent trial only once
every seven years.68 As noted, many district judges express discomfort with
complex technologies, and district courts misinterpret claims in a third of cases
appealed to the Federal Circuit.6 ' Additionally, experimental studies have
confirmed the existence of a hindsight bias that skews determinations of
nonobviousness. 70 Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that, if anything,
patents and the patent system are growing in complexity.71 All of this portends
a future in which district judges will continue to struggle to understand
patented inventions.
While this Article focuses on the technological anxieties of district judges, a
brief consideration of juries corroborates this phenomenon. Even outside of
patent law, critics have questioned jurors' ability to understand scientific
evidence.7 ' These concerns are amplified in patent cases, which are "suffused
903, 926 (1994) ("The entire description of the nature of computer programs in the
[Computer Associates] opinion is wrong.").
67. See Norman H. Beamer & Janise Lee, Freedom of Choice, RECORDER (LITIG. SuPP.) (S.F.),
Autumn 2009, at 3, 3 (finding that seven of eighty-seven districts account for half of all
patent infringement filings); Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does
Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REv. 889, 892 (2001).
68. Neil E. Graham, Specialized Patent Trial Court, Judges, Debated at House Hearing on Patent
Reform, 70 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 174o, at 657 (Oct. 14, 2005).
69. See Moore, supra note 44, at 2.
70. See Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight
Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1393 (20o6).
71. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent
System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77 (2002).
72. CARNEGIE COMM'N, supra note 6, at ii. Courts have even considered a "complexity
exception" to the Seventh Amendment guarantee of a trial by jury in scientifically
complicated cases. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d lo69, 1079-80
(3d Cir. 1980); Brewer, supra note 44, at 1673-76. In the wake of the Supreme Court's
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), several
psychological studies cast doubt on the ability of jurors to understand and evaluate expert
evidence. Although these studies do not deal with scientific evidence per se, they illustrate
cognitive burdens imposed by technical information. See, e.g., Lora M. Levett & Margaret
Bull Kovera, The Effectiveness of Opposing Expert Witnesses for Educating Jurors About
16
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with complicated findings of scientific fact."7 Judges,74 commentators, 5 and
practitioners76 have all questioned the ability of juries to resolve technological
disputes. These concerns underlie proposals to eliminate juries from patent
cases" and establish specialized trial courts for such disputes.'5 While district
judges possess specialized legal training, they, like most jurors, are generally
laypersons in terms of technological sophistication. Ultimately, lay actors in the
patent system, including district judges, experience difficulties in
understanding the technologies at the heart of patent cases."
B. Traditional Proposals To Ameliorate Cognitive Burdens
The difficulties of generalist judges adjudicating patent cases have spurred
numerous proposals for reform. Unfortunately, all have clear limitations. One
obvious approach is to enhance the technical knowledge of judges through
training and education. Indeed, the Federal Judicial Center provides training to
Unreliable Expert Evidence, 32 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 363 (2008); Bradley D. McAuliff,
Margaret Bull Kovera & Gabriel Nunez, Can Jurors Recognize Missing Control Groups,
Confounds, and Experimenter Bias in Psychological Science?, 33 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 247
(2009); Bradley D. McAuliff & Tejah D. Duckworth, I Spy with My Little Eye: Jurors'
Detection of Internal Validity Threats in Expert Evidence, LAw & HUM. BEHAV., Feb. 17, 2010,
http://www.springerlink.com/content/col6115135jo426/fulltext.pdf.
73. Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
877, 897 (2002).
74. See Judicial Panel Discussion on Science and the Law, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1127, 1145 (1993)
("Honest to God, I don't see how you could try a patent matter to a jury. Goodness, I've
gotten involved in a few of these things. It's like somebody hit you between your eyes with a
four-by-four. It's factually so complicated.") (statement of Hon. Alfred V. Covello). Again,
the role of juries in copyright cases offers an illuminating comparison. See Whelan Assocs. v.
Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (3d Cir. 1986) ("The ordinary observer test,
which was developed in cases involving novels, plays, and paintings, and which does not
permit expert testimony, is of doubtful value in cases involving computer programs on
account of the programs' complexity and unfamiliarity to most members of the public.").
75. See Wiley, supra note 48, at 144 ("Laypersons are easily awed by technological matters
unimpressive to those trained in a particular field.").
76. See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside the Black
Box, 99 MICH. L. REv. 365, 369-73 (2000).
77. See generally Fourth Biennial Patent System Major Problems Conference: Abolition of Jury Trials
in Patent Cases, 34 IDEA 77 (1994) [hereinafter Patent System Major Problems] (surveying
issues and controversies related to eliminating or modifying jury trials in patent cases).
78. See Rai, supra note 73, at 897.
79. See Stempel, supra note 34, at 832 ("When faced with factually technical issues, courts may be
at their competence ebb tide.").
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district judges in scientific matters.o However, providing effective education
for time-strapped judges can be quite difficult."' Furthermore, given the
specialized nature of scientific knowledge, training in particular disciplines
would be necessary on a case-by-case basis.
More ambitiously, commentators have recommended appointing district
judges with scientific expertise. Addressing legal areas beyond patent law,
Professor Scott Brewer has proposed a "two hat" system in which judges
trained in both law and scientific methodology would evaluate the
admissibility of scientific expert testimony." However, while scientific
methodology is largely transcendent, most of the difficulties of patent law arise
from field-specific knowledge; a judge trained in biotechnology might know
very little about computer science. Along related lines, Congress has in fact
considered a pilot program to create patent expert judges in various districts.!
However, the prospects of implementing and expanding such a program are
uncertain. At the far end of the spectrum, commentators have advocated
creating science courts comprised of scientifically trained judges and juries.
Such aggressive institution building would, of course, constitute a significant
reform and would give rise to serious concerns over undue judicial
specialization."
Other proposals focus not on enhancing the technical capacity of district
judges per se, but on making expert resources readily available to them. For
example, district courts sometimes employ special masters with scientific
86 8
expertise. However, this "extraordinary" intervention is quite rare.
so. See generally FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf (search for "science")
(last visited Sept. 6, 2010) (describing various science education programs available to
federal judges).
81. See CARNEGIE COMM'N, supra note 6, at 46.
82. Brewer, supra note 44, at 1677-79.
83. H.R. 628, iith Cong. (2009); see Zahorsky, supra note 5; see also Adam D. Swain,
Comment, Getting with the (Patent) Program: How Congress Can Make H.R. 34 More Effective
in Four Easy Steps, so TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 319 (2007) (commenting on an earlier
version of the proposed legislation).
84. See Rai, supra note 73. By comparison, in Germany, a Federal Patent Court with panels
comprised of three technical experts hears patent invalidity cases. Swain, supra note 83, at
330.
85. Such concerns arose when Congress debated the creation of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 97-275, at 40-41 (statement of Sen. Max Baucus)
(1981); see also infra notes 126-131 and accompanying text (discussing the formation of the
Federal Circuit).
86. JAY P. KESAN & GWENDOLYN G. BALL, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., A STUDY OF THE ROLE AND IMPACT
OF SPECIAL MASTERS IN PATENT CASEs 4 (2009); see also Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim
18
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Furthermore, the range of functions performed by special masters is quite
narrow, usually confined to managing discovery and claim construction.
Special masters thus do not represent a promising broad-based solution to
address cognitive burdens in the patent system. Furthermore, while Federal
Circuit judges routinely employ scientifically trained clerks,' it is highly
unlikely that district judges would prioritize this attribute in hiring decisions.
It should be noted that litigating parties themselves play an important role in
educating courts about patented technologies, primarily through expert
witnesses. Clearly, however, such education may be biased and incomplete.
Rather than focusing on information processors-the judges who handle
patent cases-other proposals focus on simplifying information inputs
themselves. Theoretically, courts, Congress, or the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) could attempt to simplify the technical content of patents. For
example, a "plain language" requirement for patent applications could reduce
the use of confusing jargon.9o However, given the highly technical nature of
cutting-edge inventions, esoteric terms of art are simply indispensable. In
addition, such a "plain language" requirement would conflict with
longstanding patent doctrine. In large part, the target audience of patents is
not the lay reader (or generalist judge) but the PHOSITA.91 As a result, use of
technical terms is altogether appropriate." Furthermore, even if the language
of patents were simplified, their surrounding technological context would still
remain quite challenging. Given the inherent complexity of technology, the
Interpretation, 14 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1, 63 (2000) (discussing several mechanisms available
to aid judicial claim construction, including appointing special masters).
87. Schwarzer, supra note 25, at 4; see THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SPECIAL
MASTERS' INCIDENCE AND ACTIvITY: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE'S ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES AND ITS SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPECIAL MASTERS 16 (2000)
(finding that parties only formally considered appointing a special master in about 0.27% of
patent cases).
88. KESAN &BALL, supra note 86, at 6.
89. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 43, at 1197 n.18o; Moore, supra note 44, at 18.
go. See ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAw 179-82 (2009).
gi. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) ("The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make
and use the same .... ); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
banc). But see John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their "Interpretive
Community": A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 334
(2008) (arguing that the "primary audience" of patent claims "is united more by commercial
interest and legal duty than by technological expertise").
92. On a related note, plain language patents would be very difficult to search, as they would
lack the specialized nomenclature commonly used in technical fields.
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limitations of language, and the doctrinal standard for evaluating patents,
simplifying informational inputs is not a promising solution.
Finally, it bears mentioning that the PTO plays an important role in
facilitating lay adjudication of patent disputes. This specialized administrative
agency conducts the highly technical task of patent examination, and patents
that survive such examination enjoy a statutory presumption of validity. This
presumption-as well as the voluminous documentation produced by the
PTO-may be extremely helpful to judges when evaluating the validity of a
patent in litigation. Not surprisingly, some have advocated a greater role for
exploiting the PTO's expertise in the patent system.93 For example, one
proposal would enable courts to obtain "administrative opinions" on claim
construction from the PTO.9" This proposal parallels the practice of several
foreign countries that use administrative claim interpretations in patent
enforcement actions." While I am sympathetic to this proposal, the prospects
of implementing it in the near future are far from certain. Furthermore, even
under such a proposal, courts would still handle other technical areas of patent
litigation, such as infringement determinations, without the benefit of direct
PTO input.
This brief survey reveals that prevailing proposals face a number of
shortcomings. However, this Article reveals deeper, systemic mechanisms by
which the patent system facilitates the intersection of legal and technological
cultures. To explore these mechanisms, it is useful first to consider the
psychology of technological engagement.
I. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGICAL ENGAGEMENT:
INFORMATION COSTS AND THE COGNITIVE MISER
The previous Part argued that science and technology impose special
difficulties on generalist judges handling patent cases. This Part sheds new
light on this phenomenon by examining the psychology of technological
engagement. Drawing on the influential "cognitive miser" model, this Part
shows that laypersons often utilize heuristics and defer to expert opinion to
reduce the burdens of processing technical information. Because little research
93. Cf Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (imposing a more deferential standard to
govern Federal Circuit review of PTO factual findings, based partly on the PTO's technical
expertise).
94. John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administrative
Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 109, 136 -48 (2000).
g. Id. at 148-56.
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directly addresses the psychology of patent adjudication, the relevance of the
following studies to patent law is necessarily inferential. Nevertheless, they
reveal the strong tendency for laypersons to mitigate the "costliness" of
technological engagement.
Thinking is expensive. A historically influential theory from social
psychology posits that people function as "cognitive misers" who are limited in
their capacity to process information and often seek shortcuts to reduce mental
burdens. 6 Of course, people do not conserve cognitive resources in all
circumstances. Studies in attitude formation have posited a heuristic-
systematic model of cognition that differentiates between two types of
information processing." In "systematic" processing, individuals exert
considerable cognitive effort to understand information inputs. In "heuristic"
processing, on the other hand, individuals rely on more easily accessible factors
such as the identity of the information source or other "cues" to reach
conclusions." Critically, individuals are more likely to engage in systematic
96. SUSAN T. FisKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION: FROM BRAINS TO CULTURE 13
(2008); see David H. Ebenbach & Dacher Keltner, Power, Emotion, and Judgmental Accuracy
in Social Conflict: Motivating the Cognitive Miser, 20 BASIC & APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 7, 7
(1998); Hui Liu & Susanna Priest, Understanding Public Supportfor Stem Cell Research: Media
Communication, Interpersonal Communication and Trust in Key Actors, 18 PUB.
UNDERSTANDING SC. 704, 704-05 (2009) (reviewing prior studies on the "cognitive miser"
model); see also Kovera & McAuliff, supra note 24, at 575 (citing studies on heuristic
processing). In exploring the cognitive miser model, it is important to acknowledge that it is
only one of several theories of cognition. See FisKE & TAYLOR, supra, at 10-14 (surveying the
historical progression of various theories). Contemporary refinements to cognitive theory
posit that actors consciously and subconsciously select from a variety of information-
processing schemes, including the cognitive miser model. 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 363 (Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4 th ed. 1998).
While recent research has challenged, refined, and extended the cognitive miser theory,
studies continue to show that it captures human cognition in many situations; it seems
particularly applicable where lay judges handle technologically complex patent cases.
97. See Shelly Chaiken, Heuristic Versus Systematic Information Processing and the Use of Source
Versus Message Cues in Persuasion, 39 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 752, 752 (1980); Levett
& Kovera, supra note 72, at 365; cf Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J.
Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6-9 (2007)
(differentiating between "System 1" (intuitive) and "System 2" (deliberate) modes of
reasoning).
g8. Chaiken, supra note 97, at 752. A similar theoretical construct, the "elaboration likelihood
model," distinguishes between "central" persuasion, which is based on substantive issue
engagement, and "peripheral" persuasion, which is based on positive and negative cues. See
RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T. CACIOPPO, ATTITUDES AND PERSUASION: CLASSIC AND
CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 262-68 (1981); Levett & Kovera, supra note 72, at 365; Richard
E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion, 19 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 123, 125 (1986); Richard E. Petty, John. T. Cacioppo & Rachel
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processing when they are highly motivated and have the ability to understand
relevant information." Conversely, where motivation (as measured by
personal relevance) or ability is low, people are more likely to conserve
cognitive resources.
The cognitive miser model is particularly salient to lay engagement with
technology. Studies confirm that technological complexity imposes significant
burdens on laypersons;' these burdens impair both learning and
performance."o2 Drawing from the model described above, technical ability and
personal relevance are likely to be low when generalist judges adjudicate patent
cases involving complex technologies.o 3 As such, conditions favor the adoption
of cognitive shortcuts to streamline information processing. Two mechanisms
by which laypersons commonly economize on information costs are heuristics
and deference to expert authority.
Studies in psychology and behavioral law and economics have long
challenged classic rational choice models of cognition.'04 Among the most
significant departures from rationality is the widespread use of heuristics to
streamline (and sometimes distort) decisionmaking.'0o Heuristics are cognitive
Goldman, Personal Involvement as a Determinant of Argument-Based Persuasion, 41 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 847, 847-48 (1981).
99. Kovera & McAuliff, supra note 24, at 575; Levett & Kovera supra note 72, at 365; see McAuliff
et al., supra note 72, at 248-49; Petty et al., supra note 98, at 852-54.
1o. McAuliff et al., supra note 72, at 249.
101. While definitions are contested, studies indicate a high level of "technophobia" throughout
the general population. M.J. Brosnan & S.J. Thorpe, An Evaluation of Two Clinically-Derived
Treatments for Technophobia, 22 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 1o8o, 1o81 (20o6) (noting that
about a third of all individuals in various studies experience "anxiety induced by
Information Technology (IT), typically computers").
102. Stephanie A. Gore, "A Rose by Any Other Name": Judicial Use of Metaphors for New
Technologies, 2003 J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 403, 414-15.
103. Cf Guthrie et al., supra note 97, at 34 ("[E]rrors seldom have direct adverse consequences
for judges-when the judge slips, the litigant falls.").
104. See Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the Common
Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 143-45 (2008); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1130 (1974). See generally
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (examining common
departures from rational choice models and their legal implications).
105. See Lori H. Colwell, Cognitive Heuristics in the Context of Legal Decision Making, 23 AM. J.
FORENSIC PSYCHOL., no. 2, 2005, at 17,17; Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAw
AND ECONOMICS, supra note 104, at 1, 3-5. Of course, viewed from one perspective, the use of
heuristics may be quite rational to the extent it conserves scarce cognitive resources.
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shortcuts that economize the selection and processing of information. o6 They
particularly ease decisionmaking in situations of uncertainty.'o7 Heuristics such
as the representativeness, availability, and anchor-and-adjust biases are well
documented in the psychological literature."os Research has shown that judges
sometimes rely on heuristics. 09
Heuristics are particularly salient in the evaluation of new technologies."o
Consistent with the "cognitive miser" model, studies focusing on
nanotechnology, stem cell research, and biotechnology reveal that laypeople
typically function as "satisficers, who collect only as much information about a
topic as they think is necessary to reach a decision.""' Heuristics such as value
orientations, media interpretations, general attitudes toward science, and
estimations of trust play key roles in forming opinions of new technologies."'
106. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 780 (2001).
107. See Benedetto De Martino et al., Frames, Biases, and Rational Decision-Making in the Human
Brain, 313 SCIENCE 684, 684 (20o6); Kovera & McAuliff, supra note 24, at 575. Even
experienced researchers adopt heuristics. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 104, at 1130.
los. See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 104.
iog. See Guthrie et al., supra note 97, at 3 ("[J]udges generally make intuitive decisions but
sometimes override their intuition with deliberation."); Guthrie et al., supra note 1o6, at 783
("[J]udges make decisions under uncertain, time-pressured conditions that encourage
reliance on cognitive shortcuts that sometimes cause illusions of judgment."); Stempel,
supra note 34, at 795-96. See generally Guthrie et al., supra note lo6 (exploring anchoring,
framing, hindsight biases, representative heuristics, and egocentric biases in judicial
decisionmaking).
iio. See, e.g., Dominique Brossard & Matthew C. Nisbet, Deference to Scientific Authority Among a
Low Information Public: Understanding U.S. Opinion on Agricultural Biotechnology, 19 INT'L J.
PUB. OPINION RES. 24,43 (2007).
ill. Id. at 25; Dietram A. Scheufele & Bruce V. Lewenstein, The Public and Nanotechnology: How
Citizens Make Sense of Emerging Technologies, 7 J. NANOPARTICLE RES. 659, 660 (2005); cf
Regula Val6rie Burri, Coping with Uncertainty: Assessing Nanotechnologies in a Citizen Panel in
Switzerland, 18 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SC. 498, 508 (2009) (contending that citizens use
"habitualized schemes of thinking" when evaluating new technologies); Colwell, supra note
105, at 32 ("Human beings are essentially asymmetrical information-processors- once they
obtain confirming evidence of their original assumption, they are satisfied that they have
done a thorough job and stop investigating.").
112. See Brossard & Nisbet, supra note 110, at 27; van Dijck, supra note 11, at 182-85; Dan M.
Kahan, Hank Jenkins-Smith & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14
J. RISK RES. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 2-5), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1549444 (arguing that cultural values inform individuals' assessments of scientific
debates and risks); Dan Kahan, Fixing the Communications Failure, 463 NATURE 296, 296
(2010) (same); Matthew C. Nisbet, Dominique Brossard & Adrianne Kroepsch, Framing
Science: The Stem Cell Controversy in an Age ofPress/Politics, 8 HARV. INT'LJ. PRESS/POL., Apr.
2003, at 36, 38; Scheufele & Lewenstein, supra note 111, at 664-65.
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One illustration of the "cognitive miser" model that is particularly relevant
to adjudication is the use of metaphors to understand new technologies."' For
example, judicial opinions have analogized cyberspace to physical space and
applied traditional doctrines such as trespass to chattels to enjoin unauthorized
access to computer systems."' While analogies may simplify the task of
understanding, they may also misrepresent the technology at hand."'
Another manifestation of the cognitive miser model is deference to expert
authority."' Rather than wrestle with understanding a complex technology,
many people simply seek out expert opinions. Epistemologists suggest that
deference to expertise is a rational means for the nonexpert to obtain technical
"knowledge";"' psychological research on public understanding of science
confirms this phenomenon. One study found that American public opinion
concerning biotechnology was "to some extent, 'pre-shaped' by a strong
deference to scientific authority, a basic value predisposition cultivated by the
nature of the American educational system.""" Similarly, when evaluating the
risks of this technology, individuals placed more importance on choosing
expert institutions to trust rather than generating their own probabilistic
accounts of harm."' Interestingly, deference to scientific authority is greater in
older, highly educated males' -demographics that characterize a substantial
number of federal district judges.
113. Gore, supra note 102.
114. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., loo F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069-72 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
115. See Gore, supra note 102, at 448; Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 521,
528-29 (2003).
n6. As a general matter, psychologists have found that deference to expertise is higher when a
cognitive task has a low degree of personal relevance or impact. Petty et al., supra note 98, at
853. Again, this is likely to be the case for district judges (and juries) endeavoring to
understand technologies in the context of patent litigation.
117. See John Hardwig, Epistemic Dependence, 82 J. PHIL. 335, 343 (1985).
11s. Brossard & Nisbet, supra note i1o, at 29. Although one must draw inferences with caution,
psychological research on obedience also suggests a strong general tendency to defer to
scientific authority. See Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 371 (1963) (finding test subjects highly obedient to scientists conducting
apparently harmful research); Stanley Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and
Disobedience to Authority, 18 HuM. REL. 57 (1965) (extending and analyzing obedience
experiments); see also Thomas Blass, The Milgram Paradigm After 35 Years: Some Things We
Now Know About Obedience to Authority, 29 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 955, 963-64 (1999)
(suggesting that obedience to scientists arises in part because of their perceived expertise).
ng. Brossard & Nisbet, supra note 11o, at 33.
120. Id. at 38-39.
24
120:2 2010
PATENT LAW AND THE TWO CULTURES
Turning to law, deference to scientific expertise is particularly relevant to
lay assessments of scientific evidence. As Professor Brewer notes, "Lacking the
information necessary to make cogent independent judgments about which of
the competing scientific experts to believe, nonexpert legal decisionmakers
choose among the experts by relying on such indicia of expertise as credentials,
reputation, and demeanor.""' Again, rather than grapple with the difficulties of
understanding scientific evidence, laypersons tend to seek out and trust expert
authority."2
In sum, when confronted with complex technologies, many nonexperts
commonly adopt simplifying heuristics and defer to expert authority. Judges
are not immune to these tendencies, and legal education may even reinforce
them." My aim is not to assess these mechanisms normatively so much as it is
to describe them; the "cognitive miser" model is adaptive in some senses and
potentially distorting in others. These studies, however, raise the provocative
question of whether the "cognitive miser" model is reflected in the patent
system. I explore this question in the next Part, with particular reference to
formalism."
III.AN INFORMATION-COST THEORY OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT
DOCTRINE: FORMALISM AND TECHNOLOGICAL ENGAGEMENT
This Part draws from the preceding psychological principles to present an
information-cost theory of patent doctrine. It focuses on the well-recognized
formalistic nature of Federal Circuit patent jurisprudence. It argues that such
formalism operates as a heuristic that lowers the cognitive burdens associated
121. Brewer, supra note 44, at 1538.
122. For general observations on the tendency of legal actors to defer to scientific expertise, see
FELDMAN, supra note go, at 37-48.
123. Legal education, unlike training in psychology and medicine, cultivates a deterministic
approach to problem solving in which statistical and probabilistic reasoning plays a
relatively small role. See Kovera & McAuliff, supra note 24, at 584; Darrin R. Lehman,
Richard 0. Lempert & Richard E. Nisbett, The Effects of Graduate Training on Reasoning:
Formal Discipline and Thinking About Everyday-Life Events, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 431, 438,
44o (1988).
124. In laying this foundation, I do not necessarily suggest that lay actors in the patent system
utilize the specific heuristics and deferential mechanisms described here. Among other
considerations, values-based heuristics are largely inapposite to the vast majority of patented
inventions, from semiconductors to adjustable gas pedals, which do not elicit strong cultural
reactions. Rather, my point is broader and simpler: technological complexity imposes
cognitive burdens on nonexperts, which motivates the adoption of mechanisms to
economize on information costs.
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with lay adjudication of technological disputes. While familiar concerns such as
uniformity and consistency often justify formalism, this Part argues that
formalism is particularly salient to mediating the intersection of legal and
technological cultures.122
As a prelude, it is first useful to explore a central institution in the
development of formalistic patent doctrine: the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit."' In the late 1970s and early 198os, Congress became
increasingly concerned over differences among the regional circuit courts in the
substance and application of patent law.12 7 To enhance national uniformity, as
well as to address other structural deficiencies,"' Congress enacted the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982.129 The Act created the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, which merged the Court of Claims and the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals. The Act defines the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction
substantively rather than geographically; it hears appeals in various disputes
concerning patents, trademarks, tariffs and customs, technology transfer
regulations, government contracts, and labor matters. 3 o Notwithstanding this
125. As Professor Arti Rai observes,
[T]hough a few scholars have alluded to the Federal Circuit's tendencies towards
de novo fact finding and bright-line rules, they have not discussed whether this
behavior may be justified by the court's dependence on inferior decisionmakers of
questionable competence in the realms of fact finding and factually oriented
policy application.
Rai, supra note 15, at 1038-39. This Article helps to fill this void. While Professor Rai
proposes a variety of institutional reforms, including the establishment of specialized trial
courts, this Article focuses on the role of formalism and clear doctrinal frameworks in
facilitating lay adjudication of technologically intensive patent disputes.
126. For extensive examinations of the Federal Circuit's origins and operations, see Dreyfuss, The
Federal Circuit, supra note 15; Dreyfuss, Continuing Experiment, supra note 15; and Dreyfuss,
Institutional Identity, supra note 15.
127. S. REP. No. 97-275, at 3 (1981); H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 20-23 (1981).
128. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 17-18 (1981) (describing a "crisis" in the federal appellate
caseload).
129. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (relevant provisions codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
130. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit, supra note 15, at 4; see also Paul R. Michel, Foreword: Assuring
Consistency and Uniformity of Precedent and Legal Doctrine in the Areas of Subject Matter
jurisdiction Entrusted Exclusively to the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit: A View from
the Top, 58 AM. U. L. REv 699, 699-700 (2009) (describing the Federal Circuit's appellate
jurisdiction). Congressional reports explicitly emphasized that, due to its broad jurisdiction,
the Federal Circuit is not a "specialized" court. H.R. ReP. No. 97-312, at 19 (1981).
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broad jurisdiction, patent cases compose about thirty-five percent of the
Federal Circuit's docket.'
As many have observed, Federal Circuit patent doctrine is highly
formalistic."' In particular, as Professor John Thomas has pointed out, Federal
Circuit case law is characterized by "adjudicative rule formalism," which relies
on bright-line rules instead of flexible standards."' Federal Circuit
jurisprudence has actually become more formalistic over time: where it once
employed tests considering "all the facts and circumstances," the court now
considers only discrete sets of factors."' Furthermore, rules have become
"leaner" in that they have fewer components."' While the Federal Circuit's
formalistic jurisprudence promotes predictability and certainty in patent
adjudication, ,6 it has also attracted criticism as undermining innovation
policy.' 7 Interestingly, the Federal Circuit tends to be formalistic not only in its
substantive doctrine, but also in its reasoning. Unlike the approaches of several
other appellate courts, the Federal Circuit rarely cites extralegal materials, such
as empirical and economic scholarship, in its opinions.'
131. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, ADJUDICATION BY MERITs PANELS, BY
CATEGORY, FY 2008, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/the-court/statistics/
ChartAdjudicationso8.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2010).
132. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim Construction,
9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123 (2005) [hereinafter Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based
Formalism]; Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court's Complicity in Federal Circuit
Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Holbrook,
Supreme Court's Complicity]; Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's
Uniformity Principle, ioi Nw. U. L. REV. 1619, 1644 (2007); Rai, supra note 15, at lo4o;
Thomas, supra note 15; see also Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 321, 374 (2009) (suggesting that conceiving of patents as rights to
exclude contributes to enforcing them by rules rather than standards).
133. Thomas, supra note i5, at 775-76.
134. Id. at 773.
135. Id. at 773-74.
136. See Holbrook, Supreme Court's Complicity, supra note 132, at 1.
137. Rai, supra note 15, at 1040 ("[T]he Federal Circuit has substituted formalist decisionmaking
for the fact-specific, policy-oriented analysis that is required by the open-ended language of
the patent statute."); cf Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn, supra note 15, at 803
("[The Federal Circuit] rarely provides insight into the policy rationale for its own
decisions.").
138. See Dreyfuss, Continuing Experiment, supra note 15, at 780-81; Nard, supra note 15, at 678-83.
Interestingly, the Federal Circuit also appears to be formalistic in its understanding and
application of science. See FELDMAN, supra note go, at 30-31 (providing examples from
molecular biology).
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Before proceeding, it is useful to clarify what I mean by formalism, a
concept subject to many connotations. 9 For the purposes of this Article, I
define formalism as "decisionmaking according to rule."40 Formalistic
jurisprudence involves identifying and articulating bright-line rules as opposed
to broader, more flexible standards. Notably, the primacy of rules "screen[s]
off from a decisionmaker factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would
otherwise take into account."' 4 ' Formalistic adjudication is thus truncated. It
relies on a limited set of hard-edged rules (preferably fewer rather than more)
and excludes extraneous considerations in reaching decisions. As should be
clear, the distinction between formalism and holism also intersects with the
traditional legal dichotomy between rules and standards.'4 ' Formalism
according to rule eschews discretionary, flexible standards.
This Part sheds light on the surprising role of formalism in mediating
technologically complex legal disputes. It thus adds a novel dimension to the
traditional debate on the merits and demerits of formalism, a topic of
significant academic interest. 143 In advancing this descriptive theory of Federal
Circuit doctrine, however, it is important to cabin and contextualize my claims.
First, I make no claims about intentionality; I do not contend, for instance, that
139. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, "With Me, It's All er Nuthin'": Formalism in Law and Morality, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 530, 531 (1999); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Frank I. Michelman, A Brief Anatomy of
Adjudicative Rule-Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 934 (1999); Richard H. Pildes, Forms of
Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 607 (1999); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509
(1988).
140. Schauer, supra note 139, at 5io. These rules may be articulated in statute, and one conception
of formalism refers to a mode of statutory interpretation that elevates textual fidelity over
legislative intent and contextual factors. As we will see, an analogy could be drawn between
this mode of statutory interpretation and Federal Circuit claim construction doctrine. See
infra notes 146-162 and accompanying text. In general, however, I use formalism in a
broader sense to refer to rule-based adjudication (including instances where rules arise from
judge-made law).
141. Schauer, supra note 139, at 510.
142. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379 (1985).
143. Compare Kennedy, supra note 139, at 1688 (characterizing the "two great social virtues of
formally realizable rules" as "restraint of official arbitrariness and certainty"), with Kelly
Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L.
REV. 333, 368 (2007) ("At best ... the formalist approach to claim construction offered a
superficially certain multi-step framework for performing a claim construction analysis.").
For other analyses of formalism, see Thomas, supra note 15, at 774-75; and supra note 139.
Again, many attributes of formalism, such as ex ante certainty, clarity, and reduced judicial
discretion, are also associated with rules in the familiar "rules versus standards" debate. See
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 622 (1992);
Schlag, supra note 142, at 383-90 (exploring the "Rules v. Standards Dialectic").
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the Federal Circuit consciously creates formalistic doctrine to ease cognitive
burdens on judges. Rather, formalism is probably best understood as a
byproduct of the court's broader aim to unify patent law and make it more
predictable. Second, by focusing on formalism as a methodological device, I do
not argue that substantive Federal Circuit doctrine always decreases cognitive
burdens for district judges; in some contexts, it clearly does not. Third, while I
situate my analysis within the Federal Circuit's well-recognized tendency to
produce formalistic doctrine, I acknowledge that some decisions depart from
this trend." Finally, as I will explore below, formalism operates in complex
ways; there may be instances where formalistic doctrine simultaneously
increases some cognitive burdens while reducing others.
With these caveats in place, I argue that Federal Circuit formalism is
performing more work than initially meets the eye. In particular, I contend that
this doctrinal methodology helps reduce information costs associated with lay
engagement with technology. 145  In general, formalism truncates and
circumscribes legal inquiries, thus decreasing the extent to which lay judges
must engage technologically challenging subject matter. I illustrate this
principle by examining four central concepts in patent law: claim construction,
prosecution history estoppel, nonobviousness, and remedies.
A. Claim Construction
Claim construction offers a prime example of Federal Circuit formalism. All
patents conclude with one or more claims, which are highly stylized sentences
"particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention. "141 It is often said that claims define the
"metes and bounds" of an invention.'4 ' Accordingly, claim construction-
interpreting the meaning and scope of claims-often determines the outcome
144. See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(articulating a broad, functional approach to the doctrine of equivalents), rev'd, 520 U.S. 17
(1997).
145. Cf A. Samuel Oddi, Regeneration in American Patent Law: Statutory Subject Matter, 46 IDEA
491, 495 (20o6) ("[F]ormalism might play a significantly greater role in patent law because
of its technological and legal nature."); Schlag, supra note 142, at 428 (describing the
tendency of rule-based systems of knowledge to truncate inquiries and exclude context).
146. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2oo6).
147. See, e.g., In reWarmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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of patent litigation."'5 Under prevailing doctrine, judges (rather than juries)
perform this cognitively demanding task."'
As Professor Craig Allen Nard describes, over the past several decades, two
competing approaches to claim construction have emerged within the Federal
Circuit: "hypertextualism" and "pragmatic textualism."' Hypertextualism is
"highly formalistic.".' It focuses on the language of the claims rather than on
extrinsic evidence, such as dictionary definitions, industry custom, and general
scientific principles, to determine their meaning."' Pragmatic textualism places
more weight on extrinsic evidence in construing claims."' Since the mid-199os,
the Federal Circuit has gradually moved toward the hypertextualist rather than
the pragmatic textualist approach to claim construction.5 4 This shift has been
148. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 205 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman 1), 52 F. 3d 967, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc)
(Newman, J., dissenting), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (Markman II); Moore, supra note 44, at
8.
149. Markman 1, 52 F. 3d at 971, afd, 517 U.S. at 391. From one perspective, this appears to be an
instance where substantive Federal Circuit doctrine affirmatively increased cognitive
demands on judges. However, it is important to understand Markman I (as well as
Markman II) as addressing the relative technical competence of judges and juries. The
Federal Circuit assigned claim construction to judges based in significant part on judges'
expertise in interpreting documents. Id. at 987. In so doing, concerns over the technological
complexity of claim construction lay in the background. See id. at 993 (Mayer, J.,
concurring) (accusing the majority of creating a "complexity" exception to the right of trial
by jury). The implicit view that judges can understand technological documents better than
juries also played a role in the Supreme Court's Markman II affirmance. See 517 U.S. at 388-
89. In this sense, the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court Markman decisions are consistent
with a broad program of lowering the costs of lay engagement with technology. Neither
judges nor juries are ideally equipped to construe claims; however, these decisions assign
this technical task to the lay party (judges) better situated to perform it.
15o. Nard, supra note 86. Professors Polk Wagner and Lee Petherbridge identify a different
methodological split, which they characterize as "procedural" versus "holistic." Procedural
claim construction is fairly rule-based and follows an established hierarchy of interpretative
aids. Holistic claim construction is more free-form and case-specific, and it does not
necessarily follow a strict hierarchy of interpretive sources. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra
note 15, at 1111, 1133-34.
151. Nard, supra note 86, at 5.
152. Id. ("[Hypertextualism] stresses textual fidelity and internal textual coherence, but eschews
extrinsic evidence as an interpretive tool, portraying its use as 'rarely, if ever,' proper.")
(footnote omitted).
153. Id. at 6.
154. In Markman II, 517 U.S. 370, the Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's decision that
claim construction is a question of law to be resolved by judges rather than juries. Following
Markman II, the Federal Circuit seemed to favor intrinsic sources of evidence in claim
construction. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3 d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
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highly controversial, and all the more complicated because of a fair degree of
methodological heterogeneity among the individual members of the Federal
Circuit."s
Without wading into the debate over which approach is superior, I wish
simply to highlight that hypertextualism decreases the degree to which district
judges must engage technological context. Whether characterized as a merit or
demerit, hypertextualism partially insulates both the district court judge and
appellate judges from certain difficult, technologically intensive inquiries."* As
Professor Kelly Mullally observes, "A formalist approach [to claim
construction] strictly limits the universe of permissible interpretative sources.
By contrast, a substantive approach allows a decision maker to consider a
broader information set to determine meaning.""' Hypertextualism
"truncates" claim construction by deprioritizing extrinsic, highly technical
information sources such as scientific treatises, expert testimony, and industry
norms.
("[W]here the public record [(i.e., claims, written description, and prosecution history)]
unambiguously describes the scope of the patented invention, reliance on any extrinsic
evidence is improper."); Nard, supra note 86, at 19 (discussing Vitronics). But see Paul
Michel, Judicial Constellations: Guiding Principles as Navigational Aids, 54 CASE W. REs. L.
REV. 757, 766 (2004) (stating that Vitronics, which he authored, "does not stand for the
proposition for which it is commonly cited" that "the district judge may not look at extrinsic
evidence"). Under its popular interpretation, Vitronics represented a victory for
hypertextualism over pragmatic textualism. However, several subsequent Federal Circuit
decisions placed intrinsic and extrinsic evidence on equal footing. See, e.g., Fromson v. Anitec
Printing Plates, Inc., 132 F.3d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Nard, supra note 86, at 26-27
(discussing Fromson). The Federal Circuit tried to resolve this debate in its in banc opinion
in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., which held that claim construction is a question of
law to be reviewed de novo on appeal. 138 F-3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (in banc). This holding
suggested a diminished role for extrinsic evidence in claim construction. However, in Texas
Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., the court espoused consulting dictionaries first before
considering the specification and prosecution history. 308 F.3d 1193, 1201-05 (Fed. Cir.
2002); see Mullally, supra note 143, at 354. Finally, in Phillips v. AWH Corp., another en banc
decision, the Federal Circuit held that judges were to attach greater weight to intrinsic
evidence (such as the claims themselves, specification, and prosecution history) relative to
extrinsic evidence (such as dictionaries, treatises, and expert testimony). 415 F.3d 1303, 1317
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 15, at 1112, 1148
(noting that the Federal Circuit is becoming more rules-based and that it favors
proceduralism over holism).
155. Cf Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 15, at 1159-63 (situating individual judges along the
proceduralist-holistic continuum).
156. See Nard, supra note 86, at 40 ("Unlike pragmatic textualism with its emphasis on context
and consequences, hypertextualism fosters a disconnect between claim interpretation and
industry practices . . . .").
157. See Mullally, supra note 143, at 340.
31
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
From one perspective, of course, this approach makes the judge's job more
difficult: she may desire more context and information to guide her
interpretation of patent claims. In particular, relying on general-purpose
dictionaries to construe technical terms may seem to simplify the task of claim
construction."' Furthermore, for pragmatic textualists, the PHOSITA operates
as a valuable interpretive tool because "the artisan has knowledge of the
underlying assumptions present in his technological community and is
sensitive to the facts on the ground.""'
However, from another perspective, the formalism embodied in
hypertextualism is cognitively economical. Delineating the metes and bounds
of a novel invention is an inherently difficult task; 6 o this difficulty is
compounded by the technological subject matter at hand. However, in a
formalistic approach to claim construction, a judge need not master an entire
body of unfamiliar technical material. Rather, she can focus primarily on
information sources internal to the patent and its prosecution, notably the
words of the patent itself. For example, a judge construing what "permanently
affixed" means in a claim relating to in-line roller skates need not invest
considerable energy to comprehend fully what an ordinary artisan of in-line
skating would understand that term to mean.16' Rather, she can rely primarily
on her own interpretation of such claims based on the text before her.
Formalism thus lowers the information costs associated with claim
constructionl6 2 by diminishing the importance of extrinsic, technical sources of
information.
158. See Tex. Digital, 308 F.3d at 1202 (establishing a presumption in favor of dictionary
definitions of claim terms), overruled by Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1320 (holding that Texas Digital
"placed too much reliance on extrinsic sources such as dictionaries, treatises, and
encyclopedias and too little on intrinsic sources"). While reliance on general-purpose
dictionaries may simplify claim construction, it sometimes produces absurd interpretations
of claim terms. See Golden, supra note 91, at 325.
159. Nard, supra note 86, at 6.
16o. See Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
2083, 2094 (2009).
161. See K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1370 (Fed. Cit. 1999) (Rader, J., dissenting)
("[T]his court does not even consider the meaning an ordinary in-line skate artisan would
attach to 'permanently."'). The formalistic nature of claim construction has also influenced
claim drafting. Patent claims tend to be long, detailed, and quite formalistic. See Mullally,
supra note 143, at 374 ("[F]ormalist drafting implicitly recognizes the tension inherent in a
generalist judge interpreting words from a specialized, technical standpoint. It is an effort to
ease the obstacles facing judges in trying to stand in the place of a person of ordinary skill in
the art.").
162. Notably, it represents but one of several judicial strategies for doing so. See Mark A. Lemley,
The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MicH. L. REv. 101, 114 (2005) ("Busy
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Federal Circuit formalism reduces technological engagement in other areas
of patent doctrine beyond claim construction. The following Sections explore
this phenomenon in prosecution history estoppel, nonobviousness, and
remedies. Many of these doctrines have been recently modified or overturned
by the Supreme Court, a development explored at length in Part IV. These
doctrines, however, reveal the generally formalistic character of Federal Circuit
jurisprudence and the tendency of formalism to reduce judicial engagement
with technology.
B. Prosecution History Estoppel
Prosecution history estoppel further illustrates the Federal Circuit's
formalistic jurisprudence. This rather technical doctrine requires a bit of
explanation. A patentee's exclusive rights are normally defined by the literal
language of patent claims. However, under the so-called doctrine of
equivalents, the scope of a patentee's exclusive rights can extend beyond the
literal claims to "equivalents" thereof."' While the doctrine of equivalents
effectively expands the scope of patent rights, it is subject to several limiting
principles.164 One of these is prosecution history estoppel, which limits
assertion of the doctrine of equivalents based on representations made by the
patentee during patent prosecution (the administrative process of obtaining a
patent). The most important kind of representation is a "narrowing
amendment," by which the patentee decreases the scope of her asserted right
based on negotiations with the PTO. The underlying theory of prosecution
history estoppel is that if a patentee disclaimed particular subject matter during
prosecution, she should not be able to "reclaim" that subject matter via the
doctrine of equivalents.165 She is, in other words, estopped from doing so.
district court judges already resist being asked to determine the meaning of multiple terms
in multiple claims, . require parties to select representative patents and representative
claims for decision, . . . and impose significant limits on briefing and argument over claim
terms....").
163. The doctrine of equivalents thus "casts around a claim a penumbra which also must be
avoided if there is to be no infringement." Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 400
(Ct. Cl. 1967).
164. For example, the doctrine of equivalents may not extend to subject matter already in the
prior art. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 683-85
(Fed. Cir. 1990). Additionally the doctrine of equivalents may not "reclaim" subject matter
disclosed in the specification but not explicitly claimed. Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E.
Serv. Co., 285 F-3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc).
165. Professor Polk Wagner disputes this "ex post" conceptualization of prosecution history
estoppel as intrinsically related to the doctrine of equivalents. R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering
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The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, addressed the relationship between the
doctrine of equivalents and prosecution history estoppel in Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VI).'66 Among its several
holdings,"' the court ruled that when prosecution history estoppel applies, it
operates as a complete bar against any claim of equivalence for an amended
element.' This holding resolved an intracircuit split within the Federal
Circuit. Some lines of doctrine had favored a "flexible" bar, which would allow
the patentee to assert some equivalents of a modified claim element even when
prosecution history estoppel applied.'"9 However, the Festo VI majority sided
with a separate line of doctrine advocating a "complete" bar."o Thus, the
Federal Circuit held that when prosecution history estoppel applies to an
amended claim element, the patentee categorically forfeits all equivalents to
that element.
As commentators and even Federal Circuit judges have recognized, Festo VI
is highly formalistic."' It creates a simple bright-line rule: when estoppel
applies, the patentee forfeits all equivalents to an element in question. The
complete bar thus eliminates the need for a "speculative inquiry" into the range
of equivalents that survive a narrowing amendment.172 Tellingly, the Federal
Circuit justified its complete bar on workability grounds. 73 Commenting on a
stylized example, it stated that "it is impossible . . . for the public or the
patentee to determine the precise range of equivalents available under the
flexible bar approach."" 4
While the formalistic nature of the complete bar is well recognized, this
Article highlights its specific impact on decreasing technological engagement
by judges. Quite simply, the complete bar limits the range of technological
inquiries that judges must perform. While infringement under the doctrine of
Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 159, 169 (2002).
Instead, he advocates an "ex ante" conceptualization of the doctrine as promoting
information disclosure. Id.
166. 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002) .
167. The decision actually included five en banc questions and answers. Id. at 566-78.
168. Id. at 574-75.
169. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
170. See, e.g., Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
171. See Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 620 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(characterizing the majority's decision as creating a "new rigid bright line rule"); Holbrook,
Supreme Court's Complicity, supra note 132, at 5; Thomas, supra note 1s, at 783-86.
172. Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 577.
173. Id. at 575.
174. Id. at 577.
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equivalents is a question of fact, the application of prosecution history estoppel
is a question of law for courts to decide."' Under a flexible bar, determining
the precise range of allowable equivalents when prosecution history estoppel
applies is notoriously difficult. In this situation, estoppel "would apply only
where the court concluded that a person skilled in the art would reasonably
believe that the patentee had surrendered subject matter during
prosecution." 17' Accurate application of the flexible bar thus requires a court to
understand the state of knowledge of an expert artisan, industry practice, and
technical differences between the original claims in an application and
amended claims.
The complete bar avoids these technical inquiries. Under the complete bar,
the mere fact that prosecution history estoppel applies to a particular element
means that no equivalents are allowed. The complete bar thus lowers
information costs associated with adjudicating prosecution history estoppel.
To be sure, multiple mechanisms contribute to this result. The use of a rule
instead of a standard in and of itself tends to simplify adjudication. However,
the streamlining effects of rules have greater purchase when shielding a
decisionmaker from technologically complex subject matter. In this sense,
formalism helps accommodate the inherent limitations of lay assessments of
technology.177
C. Nonobviousness
The Federal Circuit's traditional approach to nonobviousness has also been
decidedly formalistic."' As noted, a new technology may not be patented if it
"would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.""9 The
175. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo IX), 344 F.3d 1359, 1367-68
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc).
176. Thomas, supra note 15, at 784.
177. It does so in other ways as well. As noted, infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is
a factual issue normally tried to juries. Festo IX, 344 F.3d at 1368. It is also highly technical.
See Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law's Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 16 (2009). The complete bar tends to constrain patentees' ability to assert
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, thus limiting juries' consideration of this
difficult issue. Thus, a formalistic approach to prosecution history estoppel limits technical
engagement by both judges and juries.
178. As noted, the Supreme Court has subsequently modified the Federal Circuit's approach to
nonobviousness. See infra Section IV.E.
179. 35 U.S.C. 5 103 (2006).
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nonobviousness requirement thus prevents patenting inventions that are only
trivial variations of the prior art.'so While other statutory requirements, such as
novelty and utility,"' are relatively easy to satisfy, nonobviousness represents
"the ultimate condition of patentability."" As such, it is frequently the basis
for denying patent applications and invalidating issued patents in litigation.'
While the nonobviousness requirement is substantively important, it is also
very difficult to apply. 14 A half-century ago, the Supreme Court established a
broad standard for nonobviousness in Graham v. John Deere Co.""s Within the
Graham framework, the "ultimate question of patent validity"-and
nonobviousness-is a question of law for courts to decide.186 However, factual
considerations inform this legal determination. 17 These factual considerations
include "the scope and content of the prior art," the "differences between the
prior art and the claims at issue," and "the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art.""' Furthermore, so-called secondary considerations, such as the
commercial success of the patented invention, may be relevant to determining
nonobviousness."9 This framework takes the form of a broad standard rather
than a set of precise rules, and commentators have criticized that it does not
provide much guidance at all.o90 Further complicating nonobviousness
inquiries, such determinations are made from the perspective of a PHOSITA,
is. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES
AND MATERIALS 614-16 (4th ed. 2007) (surveying various functions of the nonobviousness
requirement). In patent parlance, prior art generally refers to all publicly-available
knowledge, publications, and technologies in existence at the time of invention. See 35
U.S.C. S 1o2(a), (e), (g) (2006).
181. 35 U.S.C. § 101-102 (2oo6).
182. See NONOBVIOUSNESS -THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY: PAPERS COMPILED IN
COMMEMORATION OF THE SILVER ANNIVERSARY OF 35 USC 103 (John F. Witherspoon ed.,
1980).
183. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents,
26 AIPLA Qj. 185, 208 (1998) (finding that "[b]y far the largest number of invalidity
determinations were made on the basis of obviousness" as compared to other grounds).
184. See Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950) (Hand, C.J.) (observing
that the requirement of "originality," which is now understood as nonobviousness, is "as
fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a phantom as exists in the whole paraphernalia of
legal concepts").
185. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
186. Id. at 17.
18. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 17-18.
190. See, e.g., MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 180, at 663.
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not a reasonable person or ordinary judge. Another difficulty of determining
nonobviousness has to do with timing, and it is here that the Federal Circuit
developed quite a formalistic approach.
One of the principal challenges of assessing nonobviousness is hindsight
bias."' Nonobviousness is evaluated at the time of invention, which can be long
before a court considers the validity of a patent in litigation.'92 Such
determinations are therefore subject to hindsight bias, the tendency for
technological innovations to appear obvious in hindsight.'9 For example,
attaching wheels to carry-on luggage may seem obvious now, but for decades
the baggage industry lacked such an advance. Hindsight bias is particularly
relevant to "combination inventions" that combine existing elements - such as
wheels and luggage - in a novel manner.
To guard against hindsight bias, the Federal Circuit developed the so-called
teaching, suggestion, and motivation (TSM) test. Although the exact contours
of the TSM test are subject to debate,"' in essence it holds that an invention
will only be considered obvious if there was some recognizable teaching,
suggestion, or motivation to combine the various elements that comprise it. In
the absence of such a teaching, suggestion, or motivation, the invention is
considered nonobvious and thus eligible for patenting.'95 Empirical analysis
191. Mandel, supra note 70.
192. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 183, at 237 (noting that, on average, it takes more than
twelve years from the filing of a patent application until final judgment of an enforcement
action, and even longer from the date of invention).
193. See In re Dembiczak, 175 F. 3d 994, 998-99 (Fed. Cit. 1999).
194. Some commentators characterize the TSM test as requiring an explicit teaching, suggestion,
or motivation to combine in the prior art. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 4, at
11 (2003); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 171 (2006);
see also DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F. 3 d 1356, 1365-66 (Fed.
Cir. 20o6) (discussing this view). However, Federal Circuit cases before and during the
pendency of KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2oo7), hold that teachings,
suggestions, or motivations may be implicit and may arise from sources such as industry
knowledge or the nature of the technical problem itself. See, e.g., DyStar, 464 F.3d at 1361,
1365-66; Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cit. 20o6).
Commentators have also emphasized that the TSM test encompasses implicit teachings,
suggestions, and motivations to combine. Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal
Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV.
2051, 2098 (2007); R. Polk Wagner & Katherine J. Strandburg, Debate, The Obviousness
Requirement in Patent Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 96, 98 (20o6),
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/Wagner Strandburg Debate.pdf (opening
statement of Professor Wagner).
195. Dembiczak, 175 F-3d at tool (reversing a finding of obviousness regarding a garbage bag
painted to look like a jack-o'-lantern).
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shows that the Federal Circuit historically utilized the TSM test in forty-five
percent of nonobviousness analyses."'
The Federal Circuit's TSM test is highly formalistic.17 While the Supreme
Court's Graham framework establishes a broad standard, the TSM test
attempts to impose bright-line rules on the nonobviousness inquiry.9' In
recent years, the formalistic TSM test has attracted significant criticism for
producing inaccurate outcomes. In the absence of an identifiable teaching,
suggestion, or motivation to combine references, seemingly obvious inventions
will satisfy the TSM test. Thus, scholars have warned that the TSM test
allowed too many inventions to pass the threshold of nonobviousness."'
A less appreciated facet of the TSM test is that it limits the range of
technologically challenging inquiries that a court must make. Quite simply, the
TSM test truncates the nonobviousness inquiry. 00 Is a phenol formaldehyde
resin used to form metal castings in the foundry industry obvious or
nonobvious?2 o' Under the Graham framework, such an inquiry requires
understanding the state of chemical knowledge in the foundry industry at the
time of invention as well as the quantum of innovation separating the claims at
issue from the prior art. The TSM test, however, provides a shortcut by
focusing attention on teachings, suggestions, or motivations to combine; the
absence of a TSM weighs heavily toward a determination of nonobviousness.
In this sense, the TSM test functions as a heuristic that can help streamline
patent adjudication.o 2
Of course, it may seem curious to characterize the TSM test-which
specifically directs courts to consider contextual factors -as a "truncating" or
196. Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 194, at 2055. But see Holbrook, supra note 194, at 170
(stating that the Federal Circuit has made the TSM test "effectively determinative of the
obviousness question").
197. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism, supra note 132, at 128 n.22; Thomas,
supra note 15, at 789-92.
198. See, e.g., In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (rejecting use of "common knowledge
and common sense" to find a motivation to combine).
199. See, e.g., Wagner & Strandburg, supra note 194, at 101 (rebuttal by Professor Strandburg).
But see Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 194, at 2091-92 (finding no apparent effect of the
TSM test on the likelihood of the Federal Circuit to affirm and little to no apparent effect on
the likelihood of the court to reach a particular obviousness disposition).
zoo. See Dreyfuss, Institutional Identity, supra note 1s, at 797.
201. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
202. On a related note, the Federal Circuit has also diminished the technological nature of
nonobviousness inquiries by elevating the importance of non-technological "secondary
considerations," such as the commercial success of an invention, within these
determinations. Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 893.
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"limiting" inquiry. After all, the TSM test increases cognitive burdens to the
extent that it compels judges to explain their rulings by identifying teachings,
suggestions, and motivations to combine.o 3 Even so, in a broader sense, the
TSM test still enables courts to short-circuit nonobviousness analyses. It
invites courts to consider a finite set of factors - namely teachings, suggestions,
or motivations to combine -and to look no further. Once the court determines
that a party challenging a patent has not shown one of these factors, the court
may end its inquiry. By eschewing additional context, the test allows district
judges to operate as cognitive misers.
D. Remedies
Federal Circuit formalism also extends to the law of patent infringement
remedies. Typically, a patentee who prevails in an infringement suit seeks a
permanent injunction against the defendant. Determination of injunctive relief
sounds in equityo' and ordinarily requires a court to consider a host of
contextual factors.20 s However, the Federal Circuit developed a highly
formalistic line of doctrine in this area, essentially establishing a simple
syllogism: if infringement, then injunction. This bright-line rule culminated in
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., which articulated a "general rule . .. that a
permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been
adjudged.",2o6
Historically, patent courts took a less categorical approach to injunctive
reliefo 7 For example, courts have denied injunctions in cases when ongoing
infringement of a patent would best serve public health.2os Additionally, courts
203. In this sense, the TSM test may play a valuable evidentiary function. By analogy, strict
application of the test compels PTO examiners to identify teachings, suggestions, and
motivations to combine rather than simply relying on expansive notions of "official notice"
when denying patents as obvious. See, e.g., In re Beasley, 117 F. App'x 739, 744 (2004) ("The
examiner may take official notice of facts outside of the record which are capable of instant
and unquestionable demonstration as being 'well-known' in the art.") (citing In re Ahlert, 424
F.2d io88, 109i (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
204. 35 U.S.C. 5 283 (2006). See generally Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944)
(describing guiding principles of equity practice).
205. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
206. 401 F.3d. 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226,
1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989)), vacated, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
207. Douglas Ellis et al., The Economic Implications (and Uncertainties) of Obtaining Permanent
Injunctive ReliefAfter eBay v. MercExchange, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 437, 440 (2oo8).
2o8. See, e.g., Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941, 945
(9th Cir. 1945); City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d. 577, 593 (7th Cit.
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have denied injunctions where the "balance of convenience" favored the
defendant20 ' and where the patentee did not manufacture the patented product
while the defendant did.210 Notably, these decisions arose from regional circuit
courts, which had jurisdiction over patent appeals prior to the establishment of
the Federal Circuit in 1982. The Federal Circuit has taken a more bright-line
approach to infringement remedies.1  While the Federal Circuit has recognized
instances where denying an injunction is appropriate, its "general rule" until
recently has been that an injunction will follow a determination of
infringement.213
While the Federal Circuit's formalistic approach is subject to various
substantive criticisms ,'14 its impact on technological engagement by district
judges has been less appreciated. As we will see, the equitable determination of
injunctive relief can implicate a wide range of contextual factors.2 " For
example, such an inquiry can consider the role of a patented component in a
broader technology or the manufacturing practices of the patentee.21
Furthermore, injunctive relief can hinge on judicial assessments of the
"importance" of a patented invention to society at large. However, the Federal
Circuit's bright-line rule forecloses many of these difficult inquiries, some of
which are highly technological. It thus offers a shortcut that dramatically
reduces the information costs of determining infringement remedies.
1934); cf Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1ool, 1015 (C.D. Cal. 1987)
("Whatever else the court does, it will not cut off the supply of [patented] monoclonal test
kits for cancer patients who are now using the [infringing] Abbott product."), affd, 849
F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cit. 1988).
2og. Nerney v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 83 F.2d 409, 410 (2d Cir. 1936).
210. Foster v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974). But see Cont'l Paper
Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 430 (1908) (affirming an injunction even though
the patentee did not practice the patented invention).
211. See, e.g., Richardson, 868 F.2d at 1247 ("It is the general rule that an injunction will issue
when infringement has been adjudged, absent a sound reason for denying it.") (citing W.L.
Gore &Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
212. See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F. 3 d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("If a patentee's
failure to practice a patented invention frustrates an important public need for the invention,
a court need not enjoin infringement of the patent."); Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm.
Co., 733 F.2d 858, 865-66 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (remanding to consider the public health impact
of enjoining infringement of a patented pharmaceutical).
213. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3 d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S.
388 (2o6).
214. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396-97 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (noting the undue leverage that injunctive relief provides to some patentees).
21S. See id. (majority opinion).
216. Id. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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E. Summary
This Part has shed new light on the widely recognized formalistic nature of
Federal Circuit jurisprudence. It is well established that the Federal Circuit
favors bright-line rules over broad standards; this tendency manifests itself in
doctrinal areas as diverse as claim construction, prosecution history estoppel,
nonobviousness, and remedies. 17 Less appreciated is the impact of formalism
on the cognitive burdens of district judges. This Part has argued that Federal
Circuit formalism is inherently "inquiry-truncating" and that it limits the
degree to which judges must understand technologies and their context.
Whether intentionally or not, the Federal Circuit's formalistic
jurisprudence reflects a cognitive miser model of technological engagement. As
we have seen, laypersons often adopt heuristics to reduce the information costs
of grappling with technology."' Formalism provides an analogous cognitive
shortcut. Judges construing claims need not dwell on parsing complex
technological context or the perspective of a PHOSITA within a hypertextualist
approach to claim construction. Under historic Federal Circuit law, judges
applying prosecution history estoppel need not explore the nuances of
technological equivalents that survive a narrowing amendment; under the
complete bar, none does. While the TSM test forces judges to articulate the
bases for their obviousness rulings, it also truncates those inquiries: courts
applying the test can streamline their consideration of the state of technical
knowledge in particular fields. Finally, judges need not consider the nature of a
technology or its social impact when applying a bright-line rule heavily
favoring injunctions following patent infringement. In all of these cases, the
Federal Circuit's formalistic jurisprudence has historically limited the degree to
which judges must engage and understand complex technologies.
This Part has argued that formalism has the underappreciated effect of
minimizing lay technological engagement. In particular, the inquiry-truncating
nature of Federal Circuit formalism creates hard-edged rules that reduce the
weight and scope of technological inquiries. The next Part considers whether
these principles also apply to recent forays into patent law by the Supreme
Court.
217. Other examples abound. For instance, the Federal Circuit has adopted a bright-line,
formalistic approach to the public dedication doctrine, whereby subject matter disclosed in
the specification but not claimed is forfeited. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv.
Co., 285 F. 3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Holbrook, supra note 194, at 165.
218. See supra Part II.
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IV.THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLISTIC TURN
This Article has argued that the patent system imposes significant cognitive
burdens on lay actors grappling with unfamiliar technologies. Additionally, it
has argued that the patent system utilizes formalism to mitigate these burdens.
In this Part, I explore a countervailing trend embodied in recent Supreme
Court patent decisions. While the Court's reformulation of substantive patent
law has provoked significant commentary, its methodological dimensions have
received less attention. This Part highlights an emerging "holistic turn" at the
Supreme Court, a turn that pushes back against Federal Circuit formalism. It
further argues that the Court's preference for holistic, "information
consuming" standards will increase technological engagement and attendant
cognitive burdens for district judges.
A. The Supreme Court's Return to Patent Law
Actors in the patent system reduce information costs in a number of
surprising ways. Historically, the Supreme Court has done so by largely
deferring to the Federal Circuit on patent matters. For a long period after the
Federal Circuit's establishment in 1982, the Supreme Court rarely reviewed
219 fithat court's patent opinions. In the first ten years of the Federal Circuit's
221
existence, the Supreme Court only reviewed three patent decisions. In a
sense, this paucity of Supreme Court review reflected deference to the Federal
Circuit's expert authority."' As a result, the Federal Circuit became "the de
facto supreme court of patents."2
219. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Return of the Supreme Court to Patent Law, i AKRON INTELL.
PROP. J. 1 (2007); Janis, supra note 15. The legislative history of the Federal Courts
Improvement Act suggests that the Supreme Court's dormancy in patent law predated the
Federal Circuit, which was created in part to "fill the void." Janis, supra note 15, at 395
(paraphrasing H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 22 (1981)); see Duffy, supra note 15, at 276; Wagner
& Petherbridge, supra note 15, at 1115-16.
220. Duffy, supra note 15, at 278.
221. See id. at 285 ("Because patent law is a fairly technical system of property rights, the Court
has always . . . looked to specialized actors in the patent system to take the lead in
developing the law."). In some cases, this deference is quite explicit. In Warner-Jenkinson
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., the Court clarified the doctrine of equivalents, then stated,
"With these limiting principles as a backdrop, we see no purpose in going further and
micromanaging the Federal Circuit's particular word choice for analyzing equivalence....
[W]e leave such refinement to that court's sound judgment in this area of its special
expertise." 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997).
222. Janis, supra note 15, at 387.
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Beginning in the mid-199os, however, this deferential stance began to
change as the Supreme Court increasingly asserted its appellate jurisdiction
over the Federal Circuit."' In early cases from this period, the Court primarily
considered procedural, jurisdictional, and structural issues rather than
substantive patent law." However, more recently, the Court has intensified its
review of substantive patent doctrine."' In the past four years alone, the Court
has issued major decisions on remedies,"' licensee standing to sue patentees,2 7
nonobviousness,"' the extraterritorial reach of domestic patent law,22 9 patent
exhaustion,23 o and patentable subject matter."' The Supreme Court's deference
to Federal Circuit jurisprudence, as well as its general indifference to patent
matters, appears to have ended. 3
223. See Gregory A. Castanias et al., Survey of the Federal Circuit's Patent Law Decisions in 2oo6: A
New Chapter in the Ongoing Dialogue with the Supreme Court, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 793, 798-814
(2007) (providing a similar timeline).
224. See, e.g., Holmes Grp., Inc v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002)
(addressing Federal Circuit jurisdiction); Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460 (2000)
(concerning procedure); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank,
527 U.S. 627 (1999) (concerning state immunity from patent infringement liability);
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (addressing the Federal Circuit's standard of review
of PTO fact finding); Markman II, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (addressing the relative roles of
judge and jury in claim construction); Holbrook, supra note 219, at 1.
225. See, e.g., Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (reviewing the
scope of the 35 U.S.C. S 271(e)(1) exemption from patent infringement); Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VIII), 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (delineating the
contours of prosecution history estoppel); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l,
Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (defining the relationship between utility and plant patents); Pfaff
v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55 (1998) (addressing the "on-sale" bar to obtaining a patent);
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (clarifying the
doctrine of equivalents).
226. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
227. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
228. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
229. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
230. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (20o8).
231. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
232. Golden, supra note 15, at 658; Mossoff, supra note 132, at 322 ("Not since 1853, when the
Court decided eight patent cases, has the Court engaged so intensely with the working
details of the American patent system.") (footnote omitted).
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B. The Standard Interpretation: Constraining Patent Rights
The Court's recent and significant reentry into patent law has attracted
considerable academic attention. For most observers, the Court's
aggressiveness reflects an attempt to rein in patent rights that had become too
expansive under Federal Circuit jurisprudence."' Around the turn of the
millennium, widespread perceptions arose that patents may be impeding rather
than promoting innovation. For example, the Federal Trade Commission and
the National Research Council issued influential reports critiquing the
proliferation of "undeserving" patents.3 For over a decade, scholars have
warned that patents on the "inputs" to research and development as well as
overlapping exclusive rights may create innovation-dampening "anticommons"
and "patent thickets."' Computer and software firms have particularly
criticized the difficulties of navigating patent-laden landscapes.3 6 So-called
patent trolls-firms that assert patents but do not produce any products
themselves -have also engendered significant criticism.3 7 For the past several
years, Congress has considered sweeping patent reform that would, among
other proposals, expedite challenges to issued patents and curtail infringement
damages."' For some, these reforms reflect a response to the Federal Circuit's
233. See, e.g., Steve Seidenberg, Reinventing Patent Law, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2008, at 6o. Interestingly,
in repeatedly reversing the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court has expressed fealty to
historical patent doctrines. Mossoff, supra note 132, at 324.
234. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2oo3/1o/
innovationrpt.pdf; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
(Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF
GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND
PUBLIC HEALTH (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2006).
235. See, e.g., Lori Andrews et al., When Patents Threaten Science, 314 SCIENCE 1395 (206);
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); Peter Yun-hyoung Lee, Inverting the Logic of
Scientific Discovery: Applying Common Law Patentable Subject Matter Doctrine to Constrain
Patents on Biotechnology Research Tools, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 79, 81 (2005); Carl Shapiro,
Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).
236. See COALITION FOR PAT. FAIRNESS, http://www.patentfairness.org/ (last visited Sept. 6,
2010).
237. Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the
Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1577-82 (2009) (noting widespread
distaste for "patent trolls"). But see MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 18o, at 939-40 (identifying
salutary functions played by nonpracticing entities).
238. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2oo, S515, ilth Cong. (2010) (amending in the nature of a
substitute the Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009)); Patent Reform Act of
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alleged "pro-patentee" jurisprudence that made it relatively easy to obtain and
enforce strong patent rights. 9
Against this background, the standard interpretation holds that the
Supreme Court's recent decisions aim to rein in expansive patent rights.
Certainly, the Court's patent jurisprudence over the past decade and a half fits
comfortably within this thesis; the Court has made patents harder to obtain,
easier to defeat, and narrower in scope. The Court has expanded "safe harbors"
from patent infringement,4o weakened the presumption of injunctive relief
following infringement,' and enhanced the ability of licensees to challenge the
validity of patents. " It has also shored up the nonobviousness requirement,
narrowed the circumstances in which overseas activities constitute
infringement, 44 and expanded the doctrine of patent "exhaustion.""4
Commenting on a case that ultimately was not reviewed because of procedural
considerations, Justice Breyer tellingly noted that "sometimes too much patent
protection can impede rather than 'promote the Progress of Science and useful
2009, S. 61o, iith Cong. (2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, iith Cong.
(2009); Patent Reform Act of 20o8, S. 36oo, ioth Cong. (2008); Patent Reform Act of
2007, S. 1145, ioth Cong. (2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, ioth Cong.
(2007); Patent Reform Act of 20o6, S. 3818, 1o9th Cong. (2006); Patent Reform Act of
2005, H.R. 2795, lo9th Cong. (2005).
239. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Empirical Analysis of the Patent Court, 71 U.
CHi. L. REV. 111, 112, 128 (2004). Compare Allison & Lemley, supra note 183, at 205-06
(reporting that from 1989-1996, courts held patents invalid in approximately fifty percent of
cases where validity was at issue and decided), with American Patent System: Hearing on S.
Res. 92 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, & Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 84 th Cong. 176-85 (1955) (report of P.J. Federico), reprinted in Adjudicated Patents,
1948-54, 38 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 233, 236 (1956) (finding that from 1948 to 1954, well before
the creation of the Federal Circuit, courts held patents invalid in sixty to seventy percent of
cases where validity was at issue). However, it is not clear that the Federal Circuit favors
patentees in the context of infringement. Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit's Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 8s, 90 (20o6)
(finding the Federal Circuit significantly more reluctant than its predecessors to affirm
decisions of invalidity but consistent with predecessors in affirming decisions of
noninfringement); Janis, supra note 15, at 400-01.
240. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (extending the 35 U.S.C. 5
271(e) exemption to preclinical activities "reasonably related" to an informational
submission to a regulatory agency); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990)
(extending the § 271(e) exemption to patented medical devices).
241. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
242. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
243. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
244. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
245. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (20o8).
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Arts."" 6 In sum, the Court's recent interventions have clearly operated to
narrow substantive patent rights."
C. A New Interpretation: Holism and Contextual Engagement
While this substantive narrowing of patent rights is indeed significant, I
wish to highlight an underappreciated but important methodological shift in
these rulings." In parallel to constraining patent rights, the Supreme Court is
systematically favoring holistic standards over formalistic, bright-line rules.
Whereas the Federal Circuit's rule-based doctrine is overwhelmingly "inquiry-
truncating," the Supreme Court's new standards compel decisionmakers to
engage in multifactored examinations of inventions and their technological
context. In contradistinction to Federal Circuit formalism, I characterize this as
the Supreme Court's "holistic turn."
Although I distinguish between these substantive and methodological
trends for analytical purposes, they may be highly related. As with my
discussion of Federal Circuit formalism, I do not contend that the Supreme
Court has embraced a particular doctrinal methodology as an end in itself.
Rather, its methodological preference arises as a byproduct of pursuing
broader, more substantive goals. In the case of the Supreme Court, these goals
include reformulating Federal Circuit doctrine that (according to some) has
produced low-quality patents and inaccurate outcomes." Seen in this light,
the Court's recent patent decisions reflect a sentiment that enhancing accuracy
may go hand-in-hand with requiring courts to engage more fully with
technological context.
This "holistic turn" has significant implications for the administration of
patent law. Of course, any move from rules to standards will likely increase the
difficulty of adjudication."o In this sense, the Court's holistic turn implicates a
well-established trade-off between promoting accuracy, which often requires
detailed factual analyses, and facilitating ease of administration."' However,
246. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2oo6) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from dismissal of the writ of certiorari) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
247. But see Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (articulating a conception of patentable
subject matter that is arguably broader than previous Federal Circuit doctrine).
248. While a few commentators have recognized this development, none has explored the
connection between patent standards and greater technological engagement by judges. See,
e.g., Mossoff, supra note 132, at 372; Rai, supra note 47, at 2052 n.4.
249. See Dreyfuss, Institutional Identity, supra note 15, at 796.
250. See Kaplow, supra note 143, at 562-63.
251. See Dreyfuss, Institutional Identity, supra note 15, at 796.
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difficulties of application are likely to be exacerbated in patent law, where
holistic standards increase the degree to which district judges must engage
with technological context. In the following sections, I explore the emergence
of this "holistic turn" and its implications for the intersection of legal and
technological cultures. I do so by returning to three doctrinal areas discussed
above: prosecution history estoppel, nonobviousness, and patent infringement
remedies.s 2
D. Festo: A Flexible Approach to Prosecution History Estoppel
The leading edge of the Supreme Court's recent "holistic turn" is its 2002
decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyokabushiki Co. (Festo VIII) .* As
described earlier, the Federal Circuit, based partly on "workability" concerns,
adopted a formalistic approach to prosecution history estoppel in Festo VI.
Under the Federal Circuit's "complete bar," when prosecution history estoppel
applied to a claim element, it foreclosed the patentee from asserting any
equivalents to that element. 4 This approach is intrinsically inquiry-
truncating; courts need not inquire into the specific reasons behind a
narrowing amendment to determine if any equivalents survive estoppel.
On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the complete bar and instead held
that prosecution history estoppel operates as a flexible bar.' Within this
framework, even when prosecution history estoppel applies to a claim element,
a patentee may still be able to assert some equivalents to that element.
According to the flexible bar, determining the reach of estoppel "requires an
examination of the subject matter surrendered by the narrowing
amendment.""' In announcing its flexible bar, the Court did not focus on
"workability" concerns. Rather, the Court invoked the overarching purpose of
prosecution history estoppel: to hold the inventor to representations made
252. See supra Sections III.B-D.
253. 535 U.S. 722 (2002). This case attracted significant attention and "whipped the patent bar
into an unprecedented frenzy." John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise
of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 956-57 (2007); see Castanias et al., supra
note 223, at 8o8 (suggesting that Festo VIII ushered in a new wave of Supreme Court review
of Federal Circuit case law).
254. See supra Section III.B.
255. This comprised the second of two holdings. The Supreme Court also affirmed the Federal
Circuit's ruling that any narrowing amendment made to comply with the Patent Act -not
only those made to avoid the prior art-could trigger prosecution history estoppel. Festo
VIII, 535 U.S. at 737.
256. Id.
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during prosecution and reasonable inferences arising from them.2s7 In so
doing, it implicitly suggested that the Federal Circuit's complete bar, though
economical, facilitated inaccurate outcomes.
Rather than endorse the complete bar, the Court established a presumption
whereby patentees bear a burden of showing that a particular narrowing
amendment did not surrender a particular equivalent in question."" The Court
offered three examples where a narrowing amendment would not necessarily
surrender a particular equivalent:
The equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the time of the
application; the rationale underlying the amendment may bear no more
than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question; or there may be
some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be
expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in question. 9
The Supreme Court's approach to prosecution history estoppel is decidedly
holistic.26o It rejects the Federal Circuit's bright-line, inquiry-truncating rule in
favor of a flexible standard.261 The Court's test is attentive to context: it
demands that courts scrutinize the particular equivalent asserted and ask why a
patentee made a narrowing amendment. For example, the foreseeability
inquiry26 requires a deep examination of a technical field. A judge must
determine what would have been unforeseeable to a PHOSITA at the time that
a patentee made a narrowing amendment. Such an inquiry requires an
expansive understanding of the element in question, the state of the art at a
257. Id. at 737-38.
2S8. Id. at 740.
259. Id. at 740-41.
260. See Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Impax Labs., Inc., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1o89, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
("The Festo court rejected a bright-line rule, . . . favoring a flexible approach."). Festo VIII
extended the Court's holistic stance toward the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution
history estoppel articulated in earlier cases. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30-34 (1997) (rejecting the bright-line rule that any surrender of
subject matter during patent prosecution precluded assertion of the doctrine of equivalents);
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950) ("Equivalence, in the
patent law, is not the prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to be considered in a
vacuum.").
261. See Wagner, supra note 165, at 169 ("[T]he choice between strong and flexible versions of
estoppel is a debate about rules versus standards.").
262. This test has garnered support from various judges and commentators. See, e.g., Festo 1X,
344 F.3 d 1359, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Rader, J., concurring); Matthew J.
Conigliaro, Andrew C. Greenberg & Mark A. Lemley, Foreseeability in Patent Law, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1045 (2001).
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particular time, and how that art could be reasonably expected to evolve. This
multifaceted inquiry is a far cry from the Federal Circuit's economical complete
bar.
To be sure, one must assess the Supreme Court's decision in Festo with a
proper sense of proportion. As Professor Thomas notes, the Court largely
vindicated the Federal Circuit's restrictive approach to the doctrine of
equivalents; the three avenues by which patentees may rebut the presumption
of estoppel are "slender" indeed."' Moreover, upon remand and in subsequent
cases, the Federal Circuit has narrowly construed the "tangentialness",,64 and
"some other reason"265 prongs. In a broader sense, Professors John Allison and
Mark Lemley argue that changes in rules governing the doctrine of equivalents
have had little impact on actual cases and even less effect on cases involving
prosecution history estoppel.266 However, in modifying prosecution history
estoppel doctrine, the Court nevertheless exhibited a significant
methodological shift.
Notably, the Court's holistic approach to prosecution history estoppel
invites greater technological engagement by district judges. As revealed in the
Festo remand, rebutting the presumption of prosecution history estoppel
requires a deep examination of technological facts.' As a preliminary matter,
the Federal Circuit held that this determination is a question of law to be
determined by a court, not a jury, thus placing this burden squarely on district
judges.26 8 The Federal Circuit then proceeded to flesh out the three instances
identified by the Supreme Court where a patentee could rebut the presumption
of estoppel. Regarding the first option, the Federal Circuit noted, "By its very
nature, objective unforeseeability depends on underlying factual issues relating
to, for example, the state of the art and the understanding of a hypothetical
person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the amendment.",26 9
Accordingly, courts may consider expert testimony and other extrinsic evidence
263. Thomas, supra note 15, at 786.
264. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F. 3d 1293, 1313-15 (Fed. Cir. 20o6).
265. Festo IX, 344 F. 3 d at 1370.
266. Allison & Lemley, supra note 253, at 957.
267. Festo IX, 344 F.3 d at 1367.
268. Id. at 1367.
269. Id. at 1369; see also id. at 1377 (Rader, J., concurring) ("In applying the foreseeability
exception, the trial court must assess the factual record of events during prosecution, the
factual contents of custom and usage of terms in the relevant art, the factual level of ordinary
skill in the art, the factual bounds of the prior art, and the factual understanding of a person
of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention.").
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in performing these inquiries. Second, the Federal Circuit also held that
courts may, in certain circumstances, consider expert testimony when
examining the prosecution history to determine if a particular narrowing
amendment is "tangential" to a particular equivalent in question.27 ' Finally, the
Federal Circuit preserved the possibility that courts could consider extrinsic
evidence to determine whether there was "some other reason" for why a
patentee could not have been expected to have described a particular equivalent
when making a narrowing amendment.7
As cases and commentators have demonstrated, the foreseeability inquiry is
highly factually intensive. 7 ' For example, in Robert Bosch GmbH and S-B Power
Tool Co. v. Japan Storage Battery Co., the patent holder asserted infringement of
its patented power drills under the doctrine of equivalents; the accused
infringer countered by asserting prosecution history estoppel.17 1 In
determining the scope of estoppel, the district court had to examine the state of
the art of power drilling as well as technical differences between the patented
and accused drills. Ultimately, it concluded that it "was foreseeable to one of
skill in the art of two speed planetary transmissions that levers of a different
geometric shape -like the segmented, octagonal levers used in the Bosch PGi
gearset-could be used instead of the smoothly curved lever described in" the
patent." Such engagement with technological facts is characteristic of the
"foreseeability" prong of prosecution history estoppel.
Inquiries into the "tangentialness" exception can be similarly
technologically demanding. Within this framework, patentees are more likely
to rebut the presumption of estoppel when making amendments not aimed at
avoiding prior art'7 or amendments to avoid nonanalogous prior art. 77
270. Id. at 1369 (majority opinion).
271. Id. at 1370.
272. Id. (quoting Festo VIII, 535 U.S. 722, 741 (2002)).
273. J. Andrew Lowes & David L. McCombs, Off on a Tangent: Using Festo's Second Criterion To
Rebut the Presumption of Surrender, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 579, 584 (2oo6).
274. 223 F. Supp. 2d 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
275. Id. at 1171.
276. See, e.g., Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., No. SA CV 03-11o-GLT
(ANx), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6567, at *16-18 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2005) (finding an
amendment made to overcome a § 112 rejection to be tangential), affd in part, rev'd in part,
vacated in part, and remanded, 424 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cit. 2oos); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D. Mass. 2003) (finding an amendment made to
overcome a § 103 double patenting rejection to be tangential).
277. See, e.g., Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 363 (D. Del. 2004); Shane Grp., Inc. v.
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Conversely, courts have rejected rebuttals because of lack of information in the
record"' and because the prior art avoided by the narrowing amendment was
similar to the alleged equivalent."' These considerations impose heavy
burdens on district courts, which must determine what constitutes prior art,
what constitutes nonanalogous art, and whether a particular prior art reference
is similar to an equivalent in question.
While the Federal Circuit's complete bar reduces information costs, the
Supreme Court's flexible bar substantially raises them. The Court's holistic
standard does so in large part because it compels greater judicial engagement
with technological facts.28 As we will see, wide-ranging technological inquiries
and increased information costs are characteristic of the Court's recent holistic
turn.
E. KSR: An Expansive Approach to Nonobviousness
The Supreme Court's treatment of nonobviousness further illustrates its
preference for holistic standards over formalistic rules. As discussed, one of the
primary difficulties of determining nonobviousness is hindsight bias.2 To
ameliorate this bias, the Federal Circuit developed the TSM test, which
requires courts to identify some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to
combine the elements of an invention before characterizing it as obvious.2"' As
we have seen, this formalistic test can streamline and truncate nonobviousness
determinations. In addition, the Federal Circuit's test has attracted criticism as
rendering patents too easy to obtain.
In KSR v. Teleflex, the Supreme Court repudiated the Federal Circuit's
formalistic application of the TSM test."' In that case, the Court concluded
that an adjustable gas pedal combined with an electronic throttle sensor was
BCI Burke Co., No. 1:02-CV- 58, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25955 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 12, 2002);
Vardon Golf Co. v. Karsten Mfg. Corp., No. 99 C 2785, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11802 (N.D.
Ill. June 27, 2002).
278. See, e.g., Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 91 F. App'x 666 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Applera Corp. v. MJ Research Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 263 (D. Conn. 2004).
279. See, e.g., Rhodia Chimie v. PPG Indus., 402 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2oo5); Bus. Objects, S.A. v.
Microstrategy, Inc., 393 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2oo5).
28o. The difficulties of the Supreme Court's "flexible bar" are further compounded by one of the
central challenges of claim construction: such determinations are made from the perspective
of a PHOSITA, not a reasonable person or ordinary judge. See supra note 44.
281. See supra notes 191-193 and accompanying text.
282. See supra Section III.C.
283. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
51
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
obvious.2 In so doing, it reversed the Federal Circuit, which had relied on the
TSM test to vacate the district court's ruling of obviousness." Noting that the
TSM test "captured a helpful insight," the Court nevertheless characterized the
Federal Circuit's application of the test as a "rigid and mandatory formula[]"
incompatible with prior precedents.26 Revealing its holistic preferences, the
Court stated that the "obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic
conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation."121 In
particular, the Court criticized the TSM test for artificially truncating the
*288
nonobviousness inquiry.
In its place, the Court articulated a holistic approach to nonobviousness.
Drawing on prior case law, notably Graham v. John Deere Co., the Court
advocated a "functional," "expansive and flexible approach" to
nonobviousness."'9 The Court criticized the Federal Circuit's overemphasis on
explicit (i.e., written) teachings, suggestions, or motivations to combine,
noting that the "diversity of inventive pursuits and of modern technology
counsels against limiting" the nonobviousness analysis to such factors. 2,0 The
Court further observed that some designs may be too obvious to be described
in writing 91 and that sometimes, subtle motivations such as market demand
may render a new combination obvious.292 Accordingly, the Court clarified that
courts "need not seek out precise teachings" to conclude that a particular
invention is obvious.9
Paralleling its holistic vision of nonobviousness, the Court also articulated
an expansive vision of the PHOSITA. The PHOSITA embodied in the Federal
Circuit's TSM test exhibits rather impoverished inventive capacity.' 9 In the
absence of some discernible teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine
284. Id. at 407.
285. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 550 U.S. 398.
286. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418, 419.
287. Id. at 419.
288. Id. ("But when a court transforms the general principle into a rigid rule that limits the
obviousness inquiry, as the Court of Appeals did here, it errs.").
289. Id. at 415 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12, 18 (1966); Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood, 52 U.S. (ii How.) 248 (i85o)).
290. Id. at 419.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 418.
294. Cf Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 891 (noting "a judicial presumption ... that PHOSITA is an
uncreative plodder, incapable of making inventions of his own").
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elements in the prior art, courts should presume that a PHOSITA would not
do so (and thus that a particular combination is nonobvious). In KSR,
however, the Supreme Court emphasized that "[a] person of ordinary skill is
also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton."" This more expansive
notion of the PHOSITA lessens reliance on precise teachings to conclude that
an invention is obvious, "for a court can take account of the inferences and
creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ." 2,6 KSR
thus invites judges to take a broader view of the inventive endeavor and to
recognize a basal level of "technical creativity" that pervades specialized arts.
While KSR has attracted significant attention, it is again important to take
a step back to consider what exactly, if anything, it has changed. To be sure,
297 eea
commentators, the Federal Circuit,"' and the PTO' have suggested that
KSR largely affirmed existing approaches to nonobviousness. However, as a
doctrinal matter, rigid application of the TSM test is no longer proper. And in
addition to its substantive impact, KSR is important as yet another
demonstration of the Supreme Court's holistic turn.
The Supreme Court's rejection of the formalistic TSM test and embrace of
a flexible standard promise to increase cognitive burdens on district judges. In
short, the Court has "broadened the scope of the obviousness inquiry.""o For
district courts, this new, holistic framework is both liberating and intimidating.
The Court's expansive notions of nonobviousness and the PHOSITA parallel a
greater role for judicial "common sense" in determining the obviousness of
2g. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.
296. Id. at 418.
297. Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 194, at 2104-05; S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew,
Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity Principle: A Response to Nard and Duffy, lot Nw. U. L.
REV. 1735, 1749 (2007).
a98. While KSR was pending at the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit issued two opinions
arguably anticipating and responding to the Court's reconsideration of the TSM test. See
KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (citing DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H.
Patrick Co., 464 F. 3 d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 20o6); Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F. 3d
1286, 1291 (Fed. Cit. 2006)).
299. See Memorandum from Margaret A. Focarino, PTO Deputy Comm'r for Patent Operations,
to Tech. Ctr. Dirs. (May 3, 2007), available at http://www.patenthawk.com/blog-docs/
070503_USPTO obviousness memo.pdf (emphasizing that the Court did not wholly
disavow the TSM test).
300. Stephen G. Kunin & Andrew K. Beverina, Commentary, KSR's Effect on Patent Law, 1o6
MicH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 50, 51 (2007), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/
firstimpressions/volio6/kuninbeverina.pdf.
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inventions.3 o' District courts are no longer shackled to a narrow version of the
TSM test, and they have broader rein to find inventions obvious based on
amorphous factors such as industry dynamics and market demand. However,
while expanding the scope of the nonobviousness inquiry, KSR does not allow
courts to rule based on mere instinct and intuition. The opinion clearly states
that the analysis informing nonobviousness determinations "should be made
explicit" and cannot rest on conclusory statements.3 o2 The Supreme Court's
holistic shift thus puts district judges, and their cognitive faculties, squarely at
the heart of the nonobviousness inquiry.
As part and parcel of this shift, the Court's holistic framework opens up a
wide array of technological factors to consider in determining nonobviousness.
As the Court's opinion in KSR notes, "Often, it will be necessary for a court to
look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands
known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and the
background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art
.... .33 Far from the inquiry-truncating TSM test, where a judge could focus
on a narrow range of fairly tangible information, the Supreme Court's holistic
framework invites broad, substantive engagement with technological context.
In very concrete ways, KSR expands district courts' inquiries into the prior
art. In its earlier consideration of KSR, the Federal Circuit had discounted the
relevance of a particular prior art reference, the Asano patent, which tended to
render obvious the patented invention at issue.304 According to the Federal
Circuit, because the Asano patent did not address the same technical problem
that the KSR patentee sought to address, it was not a reference that a
PHOSITA could be expected to consider.o' Therefore, it could not provide a
teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine. However, the Supreme Court
expanded the range of inquiry, stating that "any need or problem known in the
field" can motivate a PHOSITA to create a particular invention.30 6  hen
considering the functionality of the Asano patent, the Court concluded that it
rendered the patented invention obvious.3 oy
301. Cf KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 ("Rigid preventative rules that deny recourse to common sense are
neither necessary under, nor consistent with, this Court's case law.").
302. Id. at 418; see In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 20o6).
303. 550 U.S. at 418.
304. Id. at 420. Notably, the Asano patent had not been considered by the PTO when it granted
the patent at issue in KSR. Id. at 411-12.
305. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282, 288 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 550 U.S. 398
(2007).
306. 550 U.S. at 420 (emphasis added).
307. Id. at 422.
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Early case law reveals the technologically and factually expansive nature of
the KSR framework. Asyst Technologies, Inc. v. Empak, Inc. offers a particularly
illuminating example because the district court proceedings spanned the
Supreme Court's adjudication of KSR.30 s In Asyst, Asyst Technologies accused
Jenoptik of infringing its patented methods for tracking articles during the
manufacture of integrated circuits.309 At one point in the litigation, Jenoptik
moved for summary judgment, asserting that Asyst's patented methods were
invalid on several grounds, including obviousness."o Applying pre-KSR case
law, the district court denied Jenoptik's motion for summary judgment on the
invalidity of the asserted claims, and a jury subsequently found Asyst's patents
valid and infringed."' The Supreme Court then decided KSR, and the district
court considered Jenoptik's post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law
in light of the Court's new guidance on nonobviousness."
A crucial issue was whether a particular reference, the Hesser patent, fell
within the scope of relevant prior art. The jury found that it did not. However,
applying KSR's more expansive notion of the PHOSITA's creative faculties,
the district court ruled that the Hesser patent did comprise relevant prior art."
Having included this prior art reference in its analysis, the district court went
ahead to compare the Hesser patent to Asyst's claims and concluded that the
Hesser reference was similar enough to render Asyst's methods obvious.' The
KSR framework thus expanded the universe of prior art the district court had
to consider and compelled detailed technical examinations of that prior art and
the claims at issue. In so doing, KSR helped raise the information costs of
adjudicating nonobviousness."'
Once again, the Supreme Court's preference for a holistic standard over
formalistic rules promises to increase technological engagement by generalist
judges. KSR expands the universe of technologically relevant inquiries that
308. No. C 98-20451 JF (EAI), 2007 VWL 2255220, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2007).
309. Id. at *1-2.
310. Id.
311. Id. at *2.
312. Id. at *4-
313. Id. at *5-6-
314. Id. at *7-9, *11.
315. The Federal Circuit's application of KSR has further demonstrated the technologically and
factually intensive nature of nonobviousness determinations. See, e.g., Commonwealth Sci.
& Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. (USA), Inc., 542 F. 3d 1363, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(noting the "highly factual" argument "at the core of the obviousness issue presented in this
case").
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judges should make while providing them with little concrete guidance on how
to do so.
F. eBay: An Equitable Standard for Injunctive Relief
The Supreme Court's holistic trend is also evident in its approach to patent
infringement remedies. For many years, the Federal Circuit had followed a
"general rule . . . that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and
validity have been adjudged."316 As discussed, this formalistic, inquiry-
truncating rule established a neat syllogism: if infringement, then injunction
(absent exceptional circumstances).' However, in 20o6, the Supreme Court
rejected this formalistic approach in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 8
In eBay, the Supreme Court replaced the Federal Circuit's formalistic rule
with an equitable standard. Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas held that
the decision to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the discretion of the
district court, consistent with traditional equitable principles." 9 Within this
framework,
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages,
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction.320
eBay is a simple holding with profound implications. The decision ended
the practice of virtually automatically granting an injunction upon a finding of
infringement and introduced a multifactor test to determine the
appropriateness of injunctive relief. 21
316. MercExchange., L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3 d. 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Richardson
v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989)), vacated, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
31. See supra Section III.D.
318. 547 U.S. 388 (20o6).
319. Id. at 390.
320. Id. at 391.
321. Doctrinally, courts have read eBay as removing the presumption of irreparable harm upon a
finding of patent infringement. See, e.g., Automated Merch. Sys. v. Crane Co., Nos. 2009-
1158, -1164, 2009 WL 4878643, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 16, 2009); IMIX, Inc. v. LendingTree,
LLC, 469 F. Supp. 2d 2o3, 224 (D. Del. 2007).
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The case has sparked voluminous commentary regarding its substantive
impact on patent strength. On the one hand, commentators have suggested
that eBay may affect everything from the market power of patent trolls" to the
public availability of intellectual infrastructure."' On the other hand, Chief
Justice Roberts noted in his eBay concurrence that courts applying equitable
principles have long issued injunctions in the vast majority of patent cases and
that eBay simply marked a return to those prior principles."* Early empirical
evidence suggests that the eBay standard may in fact be changing the status
quo. In the first thirty cases applying eBay, district courts issued permanent
injunctions seventy-seven percent of the time, compared to eighty-four percent
for pre-eBay cases. 2 In addition to its substantive impact, however, the case
offers another significant illustration of the Supreme Court's holistic turn.
Contrary to the Federal Circuit's per se rule, the eBay standard greatly
increases the information costs of determining patent infringement
remedies.326 Again, any move from a bright-line rule to a flexible standard will
likely increase cognitive burdens. These effects, however, are significantly
amplified given the technologically complex subject matter falling within the
scope of this standard.
eBay compels greater technological engagement in two ways. First, in the
most immediate sense, it directs judges to evaluate the nature of a technology
and its context when determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief. For
example, in eBay's other concurrence, Justice Kennedy instructed courts to
consider "the nature of the patent being enforced and the economic function of
the patent holder." 2 7 In particular, courts should consider whether a patented
technology comprises but one component of a broader invention as well as the
322. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006):
A Review of Subsequent Judicial Decisions, J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 631, 632-33 & n.12
(2007).
323. See Peter Lee, The Evolution ofIntellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 39 (20o8).
324. 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
325. Robert M. Isackson, After 'eBay,' Injunctions Decrease, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 3, 2007, at Si (citing
Paul M. Janicke, HIPLA Professor of Law, Univ. of Houston Law Ctr., Recent
Developments, Strategies & Tactics in IP Damages Law, Presentation to the Intellectual
Prop. Owners Ass'n (Mar. 27, 2007)).
326. See Ernest Grumbles III, Rachel C. Hughey & Susan Perera, The Three Year Anniversary of
eBay v. MercExchange: A Statistical Analysis of Permanent Injunctions, INTELL. PROP. TODAY,
Nov. 2009, at 25, 26 (noting a wide variety of inquiries informing the eBay analysis).
327. 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling,
Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., No. H-03-2910, 20o6 WL 3813778, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27,
2006) (citing Justice Kennedy's instruction).
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business practices of the patentee seeking an injunction."' In a wider sense,
fastidious application of the eBay framework invites judges to examine an
invention's impact on the market, competitive landscape, and social welfare,
broadly defined."' Under the Federal Circuit's per se rule, remedies analysis
rarely involved such considerations.
Second, eBay shifts more emphasis to another, highly technical inquiry:
determining damages.33 o Increased denials of injunctive relief will lead more
patentees to seek ongoing royalties for prospective, ongoing infringement.
District courts, of course, cannot avoid the difficulties of determining damages,
which are the only remedy available for past infringement occurring before an
injunction.331 However, valuing technologies and calculating damages -
particularly on a prospective basis-tend to be highly complex, multifactor
analyses. In a tautological sense, the difficulties of calculating damages are
reflected in the eBay standard itself: the fact that damages are difficult to
quantify is a factor weighing in favor of simply granting an injunction.3
Determining ongoing royalties in light of eBay raises several difficult
questions. For example, should courts calculate royalties as if they were to
continue in perpetuity, or as if they are expected to cease at some time in the
future? Ordinarily, royalty damages are based on a "hypothetical negotiation"
between the patentee and the infringer.3 While such negotiations traditionally
took place against the backdrop of property rule enforcement of the patent, the
value of the patent is somewhat discounted now because of the availability of
liability rule protection. 4 These inquiries, while not themselves technological
in nature, exacerbate the difficulty of protecting technological assets with
328. 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
329. See, e.g., z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
(evaluating the impact of re-releasing 450 versions of Microsoft Office and 6oo versions of
Microsoft Windows, all of which infringed z4's patents).
330. See FELDMAN, supra note 90, at 41-48 (highlighting the technical difficulties judges
encounter when performing economic analysis).
331. MERGES ET AL., supra note 62, at 378; see 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). Courts have developed a
sophisticated jurisprudence for determining damages. See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros.
Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cit. 1978) (addressing the calculation of lost
profits); Ga.-Pac. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (defining
a fifteen-factor test for calculating a reasonable royalty).
332. For a skeptical view of this approach, see Ellis et al., supra note 207, at 446.
333. Id. at 465.
334. Cf id. at 465-66. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972)
(distinguishing between liability rule protection, which is characterized by damages, and
property rule protection, which is characterized by injunctions).
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liability rules. In short, eBay has complicated damages calculations while also
making them more common."'
Early cases following eBay demonstrate the difficult, technologically
intensive inquiries now facing district courts. True to Justice Kennedy's
direction, courts now assess the relative "importance" of a patented component
within a broader product."' Additionally, courts now inquire into the impact
of a patented invention (and an injunction against infringement) on wider
societal interests, such as the availability of computer software,3 7 satellite
television,"" and medical diagnostics. 9  Courts now routinely consider
industry dynamics, as an injunction is more likely to issue if the patentee and
infringer are direct competitors.3 4 o However, there is no per se rule in this
regard, as courts have granted injunctions even in the absence of direct
competition *4 as well as denied injunctions in the presence of direct
competition. 4 ' As a general matter, these kinds of competitive harms may be
very difficult to quantify.4
335. See Ellis et al., supra note 207, at 465-71; id. at 471 ("[T] hough damages recovery has never
been a certain art, a host of new substantive and process issues have arisen.").
336. See, e.g., IMX, Inc. v. Lendingtree, LLC, 469 F. Supp. 2d 203, 225 (D. Del. 2007)
(" [D]efendant's infringing use of plaintiff s technology is not limited to a minor component
. ."); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 20o6 WL 2385139 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 16, 2006), affd in part, vacated in part, 504 F.3 d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007); z4 Techs.,
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 20o6); see also Ellis et al., supra note
207, at 455-56 (discussing Paice and z4).
337. See z4 Techs., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437.
338. See Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-00264, 20o6 WL 2037617 (E.D. Tex.
July 7, 2oo6); see also David Orozco & James G. Conley, The "Longer Walk" After eBay v.
MercExchange, 42 LEs NOUVELLES 426, 429 (2007) (discussing Finisar).
33g. See Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1105 (W.D. Wis. 2007)
(ordering an evidentiary hearing to determine the impact of an injunction on the diagnostic
market).
340. Ellis et al., supra note 207, at 442-43.
341. See, e.g., Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F.
Supp. 2d 6oo, 603-04 (E.D. Tex. 2007). eBay itself held that a patentee's status as a
nonmanufacturer did not foreclose the availability of injunctive relief. eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006).
342. See, e.g., Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 440 (D. Del. 2007).
343. Ellis et al., supra note 207, at 445, 447.
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G. Additional Evidence of the Supreme Court's Holistic Turn
While I have focused at length on Festo, KSR, and eBay to demonstrate the
Supreme Court's "holistic turn," such a trend is best illustrated, of course, by a
holistic examination of the Court's decisions. In describing this general
pattern, it is important to acknowledge exceptions; some recent Supreme
Court opinions-or portions of opinions-have articulated relatively
formalistic doctrines.m44 That being said, the holistic turn represents a
prominent trend rather than a categorical rule, and additional examples of
Supreme Court holism abound.
For instance, in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., the Court rejected
the Federal Circuit's formalistic interpretation of the 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
exception to patent infringement. 3 s That statute exempts from infringement
uses of a patented invention "reasonably related" to submitting information for
federal regulatory review of drugs.346 The Federal Circuit had created a bright-
line rule limiting the exception to uses that were directly related to an FDA
submission.147 The Supreme Court, however, emphasized the standard-like
nature of the statute, noting that it exempts from infringement "all uses of
patented compounds 'reasonably related' to the process of developing
information" for a federal submission.34" This emphasis on reasonableness -
the prototypical flexible standard -further reflects the Supreme Court's holistic
tendencies.
In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., the Court established a
holistic standard for analyzing the doctrine of exhaustion, which provides that
344. See, e.g., Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc. 525 U.S. 55 (1998) (replacing the Federal Circuit's "totality
of the circumstances" test governing the on-sale bar with a more bright-line test); Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) (holding that the doctrine
of equivalents is to be applied on an element-by-element basis and not by holistically
comparing a claimed and allegedly infringing invention). Commentators have argued that
formalistic Supreme Court doctrine in these and other cases has helped facilitate the
emergence of formalism at the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., Holbrook, Supreme Court's
Complicity, supra note 132, at 6; Thomas, supra note 15, at 781. However, these analyses
largely address Supreme Court cases from the late 1990s and early 2000S, such as Markman
II, 517 U.S. 370 (1996), Warner-Jenkinson, and Pfaff Since then, there has been a noticeable
upswing in both the number of Supreme Court patent decisions as well as the holistic
character of these decisions.
345. 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
346. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2oo6). The provision thus facilitates the introduction of generic
drugs.
347. See Integra Lifcsciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
348. 545 U.S. at 2o6.
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the initial authorized sale of a patented invention terminates all patent rights to
that item.14 1 Among its holdings, the Court expanded upon previous precedent
to rule that when an item is legitimately sold that "substantially embodie[s]" a
patented invention, the patentee's rights are exhausted.3"o This flexible
standard requires a court to inquire into whether a sold item embodies the
"inventive" elements of a patent."' This somewhat nebulous standard does not
insist on exact identity and invites detailed comparisons of patented inventions
and commercial products. While other portions of the Quanta decision exhibit
formalistic qualities," this threshold test for determining the applicability of
exhaustion is decidedly holistic.
Most recently, the Court has taken a "holistic turn" with respect to the law
of patentable subject matter."' In a series of cases culminating in In re Bilski,
the Federal Circuit articulated a rather formalistic test for the patentability of
processes.5 Under the Federal Circuit's test, a process was eligible for
349. 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2115 (2008).
350. Id. at 2122; see also United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1942) (holding
patent rights exhausted based on the sale of items that "embodie[d] essential features of
[the] patented invention"); Todd Zubler et al., 2oo8 Patent Law Decisions of the Federal
Circuit, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 758 (2009) (discussing Quanta and Univis).
351. 128 S. Ct. at 2120.
352. Professor Adam Mossoff characterizes Quanta as a formalistic opinion because it states a per
se rule that "'the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that
item."' Mossoff, supra note 132, at 373 (quoting Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2115 (emphasis added));
see also Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal
Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 510 (2010) (characterizing this ruling
as "a pure exercise in idle formalism"). I do not contest this characterization of this part of
the opinion, but I focus instead on a threshold question: what must be "sold" to trigger
exhaustion? It is here that the Supreme Court endorses a flexible standard, for it requires
sale of an item that "substantially embodie[s]" a patented invention rather than exact
identity.
353. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining patentable subject matter as "any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof').
354. In State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, the Federal Circuit established a
highly expansive and formalistic conception of patentable subject matter, essentially
equating patent eligibility with utility. 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998). However, at
least one Supreme Court Justice expressed discomfort both with the breadth of patentable
subject matter embodied in this test and the bluntness of the inquiry. See Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
dismissal of writ of certiorari). Perhaps in response, the Federal Circuit developed the
"machine-or-transformation" test, which considers more characteristics of the invention at
issue but is still rather formalistic in nature. See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2007), revised and superseded by 554 F. 3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (en banc) (articulating the machine-or-transformation test); see also John F.
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patenting only if "(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it
transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.""' Recently, in
Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court rejected the "machine-or-transformation
test" as the sole determinant of process patentability."' In its opinion, the
Court also rejected another formalistic constraint on patentable subject matter:
a bright-line exclusion for business methods.357 Instead, the Court relied on
longstanding doctrine holding that "abstract ideas" are not patentable subject
matter."s Of course, defining what constitutes an "abstract idea" is a rather
cognitively challenging task, particularly in unfamiliar technical fields.
Additionally, by their very nature, such inquiries tend to be holistic rather than
formalistic. Abstract ideas represent "the basic tools of scientific and
technological work,""' and an invention's characterization as an abstract idea
may depend on its relationship to broader, industry-wide developments and
technological progress. Ultimately, by invoking an "abstraction" approach to
patentable subject matter and rejecting exclusive formalistic tests, the Court
has invited deeper judicial engagement with inventions and their context. In so
doing, it has continued its holistic turn.
In sum, the Supreme Court's recent forays into patent law have
consistently favored holistic standards over formalistic rules. This innovation
compels greater engagement between district judges and technological context.
Whereas Federal Circuit formalism allows judges to function as cognitive
misers, the Supreme Court's holistic turn has the opposite effect.
V. DOCTRINAL INFORMATION-COST EXTERNALITIES:
IMPLICATIONS AND PRINCIPLES FOR MITIGATION
Returning to the central theme of this Article, the Supreme Court's holistic
turn presents a challenge. Employing holistic standards rather than formalistic
rules promises to increase cognitive burdens for district judges. In particular,
"information-demanding" standards compel greater judicial engagement with
complex technologies. One predictable response to this development will be
Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 611-
12 (2009) (describing the rule-like nature of the machine-or-transformation test).
355. 545 F-3d at 954.
356. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010). The Court also cast doubt on the Federal Circuit's earlier
articulation of patentable subject matter in State Street. Id. at 3231.
357. Id. at 3222.
358. Id.; see Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978);
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
359. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
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greater emphasis on "traditional" proposals to reduce such burdens.36o As we
have seen, these proposals face a variety of shortcomings.
The foregoing discussion of formalism and holism, however, suggests a
different approach. Rather than enhancing judicial technical expertise or
simplifying the language of patents, this Part argues that patent doctrine itself
can play an important role in facilitating lay engagement with technology. In
particular, this Part offers prescriptions for crafting Supreme Court opinions so
as to reduce the "costliness" of holistic standards. In so doing, it aims to blend
some of the economizing virtues of rules with the flexibility and contextual
sensitivity of standards.
As we have seen, the Supreme Court consistently favors broad standards
that compel difficult technological inquiries by lay adjudicators. However,
because of the Court's relatively small patent docket, Supreme Court Justices
themselves rarely have to apply these standards. Thus, the Court is free to
announce broad, policy-oriented standards without considering the difficulties
of applying them in myriad technological contexts. In an economic sense, the
Court's preference for standards imposes an information-cost externality on
district judges."' To the extent that these costs are unduly burdensome, it may
be helpful to enhance the Court's internalization of these externalities.
If information costs are the problem, then providing more information in
Supreme Court patent opinions may offer a solution. To achieve this end, this
Part proposes adapting a fundamental concept from patent law itself:
36o. See supra Section I.B.
361. I use "externality" here to describe a cost imposed on a third party by an entity who does not
(fully) account for that cost in making a decision. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of
Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 (1967). In this sense, appellate courts impose
externalities on lower courts whenever they articulate new doctrine without duly
considering the difficulties of applying it. While this phenomenon is not unique to patent
law, I would contend that the information-cost externalities of broad, nebulous standards
are accentuated when courts must apply them to technological subject matter.
362. 1 do not argue that the Court should fully internalize doctrinal information-cost
externalities; such an endeavor is neither possible nor desirable. Among other
considerations, such externalities are part and parcel of an appellate system where the
Supreme Court decides major interpretative issues while often leaving the task of filling in
the details to lower courts. See infra notes 404-405 and accompanying text. Furthermore, in
some situations, whether because of the subject matter at hand or to preserve flexibility, the
Court should conscientiously refrain from creating bright-line rules. See, e.g., Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010) (declining to adopt "categorical rules that might have
wide-ranging and unforeseen impacts"). Ultimately, my argument is not an invitation for
the Court to create rules per se, but an admonition that the Court should think more about
the costs imposed by holistic standards on lower courts.
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enablement. The enablement requirement arises from 35 U.S.C. § 112, which
states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same . . . .3
In patent law, enablement is an "information-forcing" rule.6 It compels
patentees to adopt the perspective of ordinary artisans in the field and to
disclose their inventions so that such parties can practice them. 6 Patents fail
the enablement requirement when, for example, a PHOSITA must engage in
"undue experimentation" to make or use an invention.
This Article proposes applying enablement principles to Supreme Court
patent opinions. In patent law, the enablement requirement compels patentees
to teach persons of ordinary skill in the art to make and use a new invention.
By analogy, patent opinions announce doctrinal innovations, and enablement
principles would ensure that persons of ordinary skill in legal arts (such as
judges) could apply them. 6 , Such an orientation would encourage Supreme
Court Justices to step into the shoes of a district court judge and consider the
day-to-day demands of applying patent doctrine to unfamiliar inventions. As
in the patent context, enablement would be an information-forcing principle.
In particular, it would encourage Supreme Court Justices to consider, limit,
and guide "costly" technological inquiries when articulating new patent
doctrine.
363. 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2oo6).
364. Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising Technology: On
Thing Construction and the Meaning ofMeaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 506 (2008).
365. See Holbrook, supra note 194, at 128-30; see also Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA
L. REV. 539 (2009) (detailing the benefits of disclosure and advocating a robust disclosure
requirement).
366. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (articulating several factors defining
"undue experimentation"); see also The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465, 475 (1895)
(invalidating patent claims that could only be practiced by "the most careful and painstaking
experimentation").
367. Cf Schwartz, supra note 54, at 225 (noting the implicit assumption that higher courts should
be able to "teach" lower courts how to apply new doctrine); Law Professor Calls for 'Dialogue'
Between Federal Circuit and Supreme Court, 78 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No.
1939, at 792, 793 (Oct. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Law Professor Calls for 'Dialogue'] (quoting
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While this comparison to patent enablement provides helpful guidance, it
is important not to draw this analogy too narrowly. I do not mean to suggest
any exclusive connection between patent law and the virtues of greater detail;
the invocation of patent enablement merely emphasizes a heightened
sensitivity to practical administrability that may benefit other areas of Supreme
Court jurisprudence as well. Indeed, to the extent that observers routinely
criticize Supreme Court opinions for articulating vague, unworkable tests, a
proposal to provide greater clarity and instruction is not entirely novel.36 8 I do
contend, however, that the benefits of greater Supreme Court guidance are
particularly salient to patent law. Applying broad, factually intensive standards
is always cognitively demanding, but it is particularly demanding when judges
must apply them to innovative technologies.
Applying enablement principles to Supreme Court patent opinions would
reduce information costs in several ways. First, it would encourage clearer
doctrinal frameworks. Vague doctrine always heightens information costs,
particularly in the technological sphere, as it expands the universe of
potentially relevant legal inquiries. Providing clear, structured doctrine would
help define and limit these inquiries. Second, an enablement orientation would
encourage authoring Justices to guide the application of new doctrine with
examples and explanations.
A. Clearly Delineating and Structuring New Patent Doctrine
An important step in "enabling" patent doctrine is clearly articulating it.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court often produces rather nebulous patent
doctrine. Professor Donald Chisum argues that the Court should "provide
reasonably clear standards and make some effort to give us a standard that
makes sense in terms of reality.""'* Frequently, the Court "creates the test, but
it [does] not sit down and methodically construct the test and explain it to
us."37o Commenting on the Court's more recent decisions, Professor Timothy
368. See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 423 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority's interpretation of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act as giving "trial court[s]
... not a clue as to how they are supposed to charge the jury!"); William A. Fletcher, The
Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 290 (1988) ("One way of describing the Court's
mistake in standing cases is to say that it has tried to formulate principles at too high a level
of generality.").
369. Chisum, supra note 15, at 7.
370. Id.
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Holbrook observes, "Nearly every patent case decided is unanimous, yet the
opinions remain rather vague and unsatisfying."
Such criticisms are particularly applicable to the Court's recent
pronouncements on nonobviousness. In KSR v. Teleflex,"' the Court clearly
rejected the Federal Circuit's rigid application of the TSM test. However, it is
not clear what new standard of nonobviousness replaces the Federal Circuit's
approach, if any.17 1 One can identify numerous "fleshy" statements from the
Court's opinion," but the precise rule of decision remains elusive. In a sense,
KSR says both too much and too little. It offers a smorgasbord of factors to
consider in the nonobviousness determination, but it does not present them in
a systematic, prioritized, or weighted manner. Given that so much now appears
371. Holbrook, supra note 219, at 25.
372. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
373. See Gregory N. Mandel, Another Missed Opportunity: The Supreme Court's Failure To Define
Nonobviousness or Combat Hindsight Bias in KSR v. Teleflex, 12 LEWs & CIARK L. REV. 323,
326 (20o8) ("Despite issuing eight opinions on the nonobviousness requirement, the Court
has provided almost no guidance concerning either the degree of ingenuity necessary to
meet the . . . non-obvious standard or how a decision-maker is supposed to evaluate
whether the differences between the invention and the prior art meet this degree.");
Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 194, at 2107.
374. See, e.g., 550 U.S. at 415 ("[O]ur cases have set forth an expansive and flexible approach
inconsistent with the way the Court of Appeals applied its TSM test here."); id. at 416 ("The
combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when
it does no more than yield predictable results."); id. at 417 ("When a work is available in one
field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it,
either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a
predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique
has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would
recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is
obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill."); id. ("[A] court must ask
whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to
their established functions."); id. at 418 ("Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to
interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design
community or present in the marketplace; and the background knowledge possessed by a
person having ordinary skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an
apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at
issue."); id. ("[A] court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would employ."); id. at 420 ("[A] ny need or problem known in the
field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason
for combining the elements in the manner claimed."); id. at 421 ("A person of ordinary skill
is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton."); id. ("When there is a design
need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified,
predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known
options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely
the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense.").
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to be fair game in determining nonobviousness, the information costs of
applying this new standard are very high.
Perhaps most importantly, KSR does not precisely identify the specific types
of information that should guide nonobviousness inquiries. In the Graham
framework, courts should consider: (i) "the scope and content of the prior
art"; (2) the "differences between the prior art and the claims at issue"; (3) "the
level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art"; and (4) secondary considerations."
While much falls within these categories, this structure attempts to cabin the
informational sources informing nonobviousness determinations. KSR,
however, advances a "liberal view of sources of information relevant to an
obviousness analysis."3' This lack of doctrinal precision invites wide-ranging
judicial inquiries into technical issues such as evolving industry trends and the
creative faculties of the PHOSITA.
To remedy this deficiency, the Court should be more sensitive to the
information demands of broad standards. One helpful approach in this regard
would involve analytically deconstructing standards into discrete subtests. "
While Graham has been criticized as vague, it took the helpful step of distilling
the nebulous statutory requirement of "nonobviousness" into a set of smaller,
more manageable inquiries.37 KSR was an opportunity to flesh out the details
of this framework, but the Court chose not to fit its pronouncements within
this structure.
While more clearly structured frameworks are helpful, long lists of factors
to consider may ultimately raise information costs rather than reduce them.
The Court could address this deficiency in several ways. In general, authoring
Justices should be sensitive to the type and amount of information that various
legal inquiries "consume." For example, Justice Kennedy's opinion in KSR
noted that "a design need or market pressure" coupled with a "finite number of
identified, predictable solutions" is likely to render a particular solution
obvious.17 ' However, the opinion offers no guidance on how to identify a
"design need" or "market pressure." Additionally, it is unclear what quantity of
solutions may still constitute a "finite" number. These hurdles could be
mitigated by simply eliminating subtests that have low probative value relative
375. Grahamv. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
376. R. Polk Wagner, The Supreme Court and the Future ofPatent Reform, FED. LAw., Feb. 2008, at
35, 41.
377. Cf Guthrie et al., supra note 97, at 41 (suggesting that multifactor tests and checklists,
although imperfect, may encourage more deliberative adjudication).
378. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18.
379- KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.
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to their difficulty of application. Additionally, the Court could mitigate these
deficiencies by providing examples and explanations, a proposal I address in
the next Section.
Perhaps more importantly, the Court could enable new patent doctrine by
assigning weights to particular subtests within a doctrinal framework. Turning
again to KSR, the Court should have both adopted the organizing structure of
the Graham framework and assigned weights to various inquiries within that
framework. In particular, the Court should have clarified the importance of
secondary considerations, such as commercial success, in nonobviousness
determinations. In Graham, the Court noted that secondary considerations
"may have relevancy."3So This statement underscores the "secondary" nature of
such inquiries, and it seems to conflict with subsequent Federal Circuit
jurisprudence stating that courts must consider such factors."' Clarifying the
importance of secondary considerations would have helped enable
nonobviousness determinations going forward. Similarly, in the wake of KSR,
the probative value of the TSM test is not entirely clear. The Court noted that
the TSM test "may have relevancy,""' but declined to define its precise
importance.
In a general sense, the Court is, in fact, capable of providing greater
definition in its patent opinions. In eBay, for example, the Court provided a
discrete set of factors that courts should consider in granting or denying an
injunction."' Arguably, the Court should have gone further to assign particular
weights to the various factors."'* Nevertheless, by identifying a finite universe
of factors, the Court helped limit the range of technologically intensive
inquiries that courts must make.35
While standards necessarily involve high information costs, precisely
defining those standards would help mitigate those costs. This is not a call for
38o. Graham, 383 U.S. at 18.
381. Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
382. Graham, 383 U.S. at 18.
383. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (20o6).
384. See Smith, supra note 16o, at 2125. As Professor John Golden notes, at a minimum, the eBay
framework requires that a plaintiff show that each of the four factors favors, or at least does
not disfavor, granting an injunction. Golden, supra note 15, at 696; see eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
However, the Court could have provided useful guidance as to which factors (if any) are
most important for crossing the ultimate threshold triggering injunctive relief To further
guide lower courts' application of eBay, the Court could have also articulated presumptions
relating to one or several of the equitable factors. See John M. Golden, Principles for Patent
Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 579 (2010).
385. Cf Kaplow, supra note 143, at 594 ("[S]tandards need not admit all considerations.").
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the Supreme Court to adopt rules per se. Rather, this proposal is situated in the
Supreme Court's commitment to standards, but it strives to make those
standards more workable through clarifying, structuring, and prioritizing legal
inquiries. In this manner, by conscientiously fulfilling its mandate "to say what
the law is,",56 the Court can help facilitate lay adjudication of technological
disputes.
B. Guiding Technological Inquiries Through Examples and Explanations
While it is useful to describe a new legal innovation, it is even more useful
to teach jurists how to apply it. In addition to providing clear, bounded
frameworks, an enablement orientation would encourage the Supreme Court
to illustrate and explain new doctrine.
Examples would play a key role within this enablement orientation.
Commenting on patent enablement, the Federal Circuit has stated, "One of the
best ways to teach a person of ordinary skill in the art how to make and use the
invention is to provide an example of how to practice the invention in a
particular case.".. Providing illustrative examples in Supreme Court opinions
would help district courts apply innovative patent standards. In so doing, it
would limit and guide "costly" inquries into complicated subject matter.
When the Supreme Court speaks, lower courts listen. In particular, district
courts have been highly receptive to specific examples provided in Supreme
Court patent opinions. Recall Festo VIII, where the Court replaced the Federal
Circuit's complete bar approach to prosecution history estoppel with a flexible
bar. In elaborating this standard, the Court offered several examples where
patentees could rebut the presumption of prosecution history estoppel."" As
shorthand, we can refer to these as the unforeseeability, tangentialness, and
"other reason" exceptions."9 District courts have embraced the first two-
rather concrete- examples, declining to apply prosecution history estoppel in
386. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
387. Phillips v. AWLH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). In similar fashion, the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences has stated, "While we recognize that specific
examples are not necessary to meet the requirements of Section 112, when present, they do
provide good evidence that the disclosure is enabling and that the invention may be
performed without undue experimentation." In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229, 1231 (C.C.P.A.
1982) (citation omitted).
388. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
389. See Festo VIII, 535 U.S. 722, 740-41 (2002).
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cases involving unforeseen technologies"o and narrowing amendments that
were tangential to an equivalent in question."' Tellingly, no reported decisions
include the more nebulous "other reason" exception.
Examples play a similarly instructive role in district courts' application of
eBay. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy identified several situations that
warranted denying injunctive relief, including cases involving
nonmanufacturing entities * (known pejoratively as "patent trolls") and
instances where a patented invention is only one component of a broader
technology. 93 Lower courts have seized upon both of these examples. One
study shows that in almost every early post-eBay case where a district court
denied injunctive relief, the patentee was a nonpracticing entity.394
Additionally, in two of the six cases where a district court denied injunctive
relief, the patented invention was only one component of a broader
technology. 95 While further empirical work is needed, early evidence indicates
that Supreme Court examples do in fact guide (and limit) lower courts'
application of new patent doctrine.
The Supreme Court's use of examples lowers information costs in several
ways. As a general matter, examples provide concrete guidance to a district
court when applying a new, holistic standard. This guidance, however,
assumes particular importance when the inquiries at issue involve technological
subject matter. Regarding Festo, a simple admonition to determine when an
"amendment cannot reasonably be viewed as surrendering a particular
equivalent" invites a multitude of inquiries into the state of the art at particular
times as well as the perspective of a PHOSITA.3, 6 Similarly, a precisely
articulated eBay framework would be more difficult to apply in the absence of
390. See, e.g., Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., No. oo Civ.9089 LMM, 2002 WL
1874831 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2002) (denying summary judgment based on prosecution
history estoppel because the patentee had raised a material issue of fact regarding
foreseeability).
391. See, e.g., Blunt Wrap U.S.A., Inc. v. Royal Blunts, Inc., No. Civ.A. 02-1990, 2003 WL 30422,
at *1o (E.D. La. Jan. 2, 2003) (finding prosecution history estoppel inapplicable because,
inter alia, the amendment at issue was tangential to the equivalent in question); Shane Grp.,
Inc. v. BCI Burke Co., No. 1:02-CV-58, 2002 WL 32059737, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 12,
2002) (same).
392. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (20o6) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
393. Id. at 396-97.
394. Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 322, at 654-55.
395. Id.; see Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 20o6 WL 2385139 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 16, 2006); z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex.
20o6).
396. Festo VIII, 535 U.S. 722, 740 (2002).
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illustrative examples mentioned in the majority opinion and concurrences.
Again, this is not an argument to adopt rules per se, but to economize on
information costs by elaborating and illustrating standards.
Ultimately, clearly defined frameworks coupled with illustrative examples
blend the virtues of both rules and standards. While holistic standards permit
valuable flexibility and contextual consideration, they can impose high
information costs. Formalistic rules are more cognitively economical, but they
can be overly blunt and rigid. Focusing on doctrinal enablement would
encourage the Court to articulate doctrine that is clear, limited, and accessible.
In so doing, the Court can help internalize some of the information-cost
externalities it normally imposes on lower courts.
C. Objections and Responses
Of course, this proposal to apply enablement principles to Supreme Court
patent opinions must address several criticisms. The most obvious objection is
that it is unenforceable. While the threat of losing patent protection motivates
inventors to enable their inventions, no sanction will befall Justices of the
Supreme Court who do not enable their doctrinal innovations. Of course,
reputational and professional interests in facilitating patent adjudication will
hopefully motivate Justices to consider enablement. Recently, the Court has
shown great interest in modifying substantive patent doctrine; to ensure
faithful application of new doctrine, the Court would be well served to consider
the methodological and cognitive dimensions of its rulings.
However, this proposal may best be understood as a prescription for
exogenous parties influencing the Court. First, parties litigating before the
Supreme Court, as well as amici curiae, should consider the limitations of lay
adjudicators when advocating particular interpretations of patent law. An
emphasis on practical application would lead these parties to suggest clear,
bounded standards as models for Supreme Court decisions. Second, more
ambitiously, consideration of cognitive burdens should inform congressional
discussions of patent reform. Along these lines, former Chief Judge Paul
Michel of the Federal Circuit has actively lobbied against legislative reforms
that would enhance the complexity of damages calculations.197 As a general
matter, members of Congress should consider the information costs of
Supreme Court standards when reviewing various areas of patent law.
397. Letter from Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge, Fed. Circuit, to Sen. Patrick Leahy & Sen. Orrin G.
Hatch 2 (May 3, 2007) [hereinafter Michel Letter], available at
http://www.patentsmatter.com/media/issue/legislation/2o07o5O3_Michel.pdf.
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This proposed emphasis on enablement-and particularly the use of
illustrative examples -is also subject to more substantive critiques. First is the
well-established criticism that courts should only decide the case before them
and not resolve hypothetical disputes.398 As Felix Frankfurter warned in the
context of constitutional litigation, "Every tendency to deal with [legal
contests] abstractedly, to formulate them in terms of sterile legal questions, is
bound to result in sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.""' Certainly, a
full-blown analysis of hypothetical situations not before the Court would be
inappropriate. Again, it would be both impossible and undesirable for the
Court to try to anticipate all potential applications of new doctrine. 400
However, the "hypothetical" nature of an opinion is a question of degree, not
kind. While drawing bright lines is somewhat difficult, simply providing
guiding principles does not constitute an "advisory" opinion that should
trigger Frankfurter's concerns.
Take, for example, eBay. In elaborating the equitable standard for
injunctive relief in patent cases, Justice Thomas's majority opinion ranged well
beyond MercExchange's asserted patent on a system of online auctions. For
instance, it noted that independent inventors and universities should not be
foreclosed from obtaining injunctive relief merely because they prefer to
license, rather than practice, their patents.4o' This was clearly dicta not essential
to the resolution of the case. However, it did not pronounce categorical legal
conclusions based on hypothetical facts. Rather, it provided helpful guidance
that lower courts can consult when applying the eBay standard to new factual
predicates. 4o2 Particularly at the level of the Supreme Court, the importance of
patent litigation often ranges far beyond the two parties paying the legal bills.
Supreme Court patent rulings have an enormous impact on inventors,
398. See Plager & Pettigrew, supra note 297, at 1750.
399. Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARv. L. REv. 1002, 1003 (1924); see also
Patent System Major Problems, supra note 77, at io ("[W]e're not a legislature .... We really
can't rove around ... to speak about issues not raised in a particular case .... ) (statement
of Hon. Alan Lourie).
400. See supra note 362.
401. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006).
402. Similarly, merely noting that courts determining injunctive relief should consider the
manufacturing character of a patentee or that a patented invention is a component of a
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businesses, lawyers, and courts, and providing guidance beyond the narrow
confines of the parties' facts may be wholly appropriate. 4o3
Second, some might argue that focusing on enablement would lead the
Supreme Court to overstep its institutional role in articulating patent doctrine.
In the traditional paradigm, Congress enacts patent legislation, the Supreme
Court provides high-level interpretation of important questions, and the
Federal Circuit elaborates the details of patent law on a day-to-day level.4o4
This structure gives rise to several potential critiques. First, the Supreme Court
may be overstepping its role by providing too much detail in its opinions.
Because of institutional competence concerns, it may be preferable to allow the
Federal Circuit to grapple with the nitty-gritty details of patent doctrine.4 o5
However, this objection merely accentuates the need for reform. If the
Supreme Court is truly ill suited to articulate patent doctrine, then it should
either refrain from doing so (which has significant drawbacks) or invest the
time, energy, and foresight to grapple with new doctrines and their myriad
implications. Focusing on doctrinal enablement encourages precisely this type
of "grappling."
Additionally, expanding on an earlier point, skeptics might doubt the
technical competence of the Supreme Court to fully grapple with patent
doctrine. This critique might highlight a perceived circularity in the proposal
advanced here: given that generalist district judges struggle to understand
technology, why should Supreme Court Justices be any better at this task?
Certainly, Supreme Court Justices should consider the technological
complexity of a patent dispute, as well their ability to comprehend it, when
crafting new doctrine. However, it bears emphasizing that doctrinal
403. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3232 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I agree with the
Court that, in light of the uncertainty that currently pervades the field, it is prudent to
provide further guidance.").
404. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997) ("We expect
that the Federal Circuit will refine the formulation of the test for equivalence in the orderly
course of case-by-case determinations."); cf Symposium, Panel I: The End of Equivalents?
Examining the Fallout from Festo, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 727, 738
(2003) (advocating incremental, case-by-case elaboration of doctrine). Furthermore, the
PTO may also help clarify patent law, as it did following the Supreme Court's decision in
KSR. See Examination Guidelines for Determining Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. 103 in
View of the Supreme Court Decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 72 Fed. Reg.
57,526 (Oct. 10, 2007).
405. The Court itself has articulated this sentiment. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40
(declining to "micromanag[e] the Federal Circuit's particular word choice for analyzing
equivalence" and "leav[ing] such refinement to that court's sound judgment in this area of
its special expertise"); see also Nard & Duffy, supra note 132, at 1663 (citing the advantages of
"open" Supreme Court opinions that can accommodate future developments in the law).
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enablement focuses not so much on a Justice's knowledge of particular
technologies per se, but on her awareness of the burdens of applying new
patent doctrine to sophisticated technologies in general. Put differently, a
Justice need not be an expert in biotechnology, computer science, or
mechanical engineering to recognize that broad, vague standards impose high
information costs on lower courts adjudicating patent cases.
Third, some might suggest that the "defect" identified here is self-
correcting. Indeed, over time, the accumulation of common law precedents
may lead standards to naturally crystallize into brighter-line rules.4o1 Self-
correction notwithstanding, there is much value to be gained from
conscientious, ex ante definition of legal standards. The Supreme Court is the
ultimate judicial authority on patent law, and greater sensitivity to the
technological challenges of patent adjudication promises to create clearer, more
administrable doctrine in the first instance.
Finally, while I have focused on the cognitive difficulties borne by district
judges, some would argue that this focus is misplaced. After all, the Supreme
Court should interpret patent doctrine in light of the constitutional prerogative
to "promote the progress of useful arts," not necessarily to ease cognitive
burdens on judges. Put differently, in crafting patent doctrine, ease of
administration is only one objective that must be balanced against others,
including the desire to achieve accurate outcomes. However, the question of
whether courts are "accurately" applying patent doctrine becomes meaningless
if that doctrine is overly indeterminate. More substantively, the "trade off'
between accuracy and ease of administration may in some contexts be
overstated. Broad standards that admit a wide range of technical inquiries may
not necessarily promote accuracy if those inquiries overwhelm lay adjudicators.
Indeed, providing clear doctrine and structured guidance to lower courts may,
in certain contexts, promote both ease of administration and accuracy. While it
is certainly true that the aim of law is not to be easily administered, if it is not
easily administered, it is unlikely to achieve its aims.
4o6. See Kaplow, supra note 143, at 564, 578-79; Schlag, supra note 142, at 413; cf Carol M. Rose,
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577 (1988) (exploring the cyclical
emergence of bright-line rules (crystals) and more ambiguous rules of decision (mud)).
Compare Festo VIII, 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (holding that prosecution history estoppel operates
as a functional bar), with Festo IX, 344 F-3 d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc) (fleshing out
specific applications of the flexible bar).
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VI.THE TWO CULTURES REFASHIONED: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND
THE SUPREME COURT
Ultimately, this study of the cognitive burdens of district court judges
concludes by considering the relationship between two appellate courts: the
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court. This Article has used the trope of the
Two Cultures to characterize generalist judges' difficulties with technological
engagement. However, the notion of the Two Cultures is relevant in another
sense as well. In large part, it describes the methodological divergence of the
formalistic Federal Circuit and the holistic Supreme Court.4 o7 This Part
concludes by exploring cultural tensions between these important institutions
and their implications for patent doctrine.
The proper role of the Supreme Court vis-i-vis the Federal Circuit has
attracted significant commentary.40 To a large degree, observers have
proposed a limited role for the Supreme Court.4o9 For some, this view arises
from the Court's perceived incompetence in patent affairs. Professor Chisum
characterized many Supreme Court patent decisions of the late 1990s as "weak,
illogical, ambiguous, or inconsistent.,,4 o Professor Mark Janis has advocated a
"managerial" role for the Supreme Court in which it: (I) only reviews patent
issues involving "a compelling issue of the allocation of power among
institutional actors" and (2) confines its opinions to the "rationale for
intervention."41 Similarly, Professor John Duffy argues that the Court should
focus on institutional issues, adhere to precedent, and refrain from leading
substantive doctrinal change.412 More recently, Professor John Golden has
suggested that the Court should serve as the "prime percolator" rather than the
"final law sayer" for patent matters.4 13 Within this view, the Court should limit
intervention to areas where Federal Circuit precedent has unduly "frozen"
407. Cf Kennedy, supra note 139, at 1710 ("[T]he arguments pro and con the use of rules have
powerful overtones of substantive debates about what values and what visions of the
universe we should adopt.").
408. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Commentary, The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit:
Visitation and Custody of Patent Law, io6 MICH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28 (2007),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vollo6/eisenberg.pdf.
409. See Duffy, supra note 15, at 342 (suggesting that the Supreme Court should "recogniz[e] the
limitations of its expertise and refrain[] from trying to lead the development of the law").
410. Chisum, supra note 15, at 4.
411. Janis, supra note 15, at 408.
412. Duffy, supra note i5, at 301-05.
413. Golden, supra note 15, at 662.
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patent doctrine. 14 In most of these formulations, the Supreme Court is an
infrequent and modest intervener in patent affairs, leaving control largely to
the Federal Circuit.
Unlike some of these other accounts, this Article does not propose
substantive guidelines for determining when the Supreme Court should
intervene in patent affairs. Rather, it offers methodological prescriptions to
guide the Court during its chosen interventions.415 It accepts as a descriptive
and normative matter that the Supreme Court has an important role to play in
articulating patent doctrine. However, it suggests that when doing so, the
Supreme Court should be aware of the "costly" nature of broad standards and
their implications for patent adjudication by generalist judges. This proposal
seeks to retain the value of a flexible, holistic approach to patent law while
providing guidance to district judges facing highly technical inquiries. This
Part probes deeper to examine the cultural underpinnings of the Supreme
Court's divergence from the Federal Circuit. In so doing, it explores a
connection between generalism and holism, on the one hand, and
specialization and formalism, on the other.
The Supreme Court's recent forays into patent law give rise to two
somewhat paradoxical observations. First, in some sense, the Supreme Court
has much more in common with district courts than those courts have in
common with the Federal Circuit. Like the typical district court, the Supreme
Court hears relatively few patent disputes.4'6 Far from being a quasi-specialized
court like the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court's wide-ranging jurisdiction
more closely parallels that of district courts.417 The Supreme Court's generalist
orientation thus offers a "commonsense" check on the more specialized,
technically expert Federal Circuit.41" This perspective is most apparent in KSR
414. Id.
415. See supra Part V.
416. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 43, at 1196 ("The average judge may hear no more than one
patent case every few years."); S. Jay Plager, Abolish the Court ofFederal Claims? A Question of
Democratic Principle, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 791, 796-97 (2003) (noting that the obscurities
of patent law, the complexities of new technologies, and the infrequency of patent cases
make such matters particularly difficult for district judges). Out of seventy-seven cases
argued during the Supreme Court's 2009 Term, only one (Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218
(2010)) substantively dealt with patent law. See Argument Transcripts, SUP. CT. U.S.,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argumenttranscripts.aspx (last visited
Sept. 8, 2010).
417. But see Golden, supra note 15, at 688 (noting the highly selective docket of the Supreme
Court and disputing its characterization as a true generalist tribunal).
418. Cf Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 138 (2006) (Breyer,
J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari) ("[A] decision from this generalist Court
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v. Teleflex, which privileges commonsense assessments of nonobviousness at
the expense of technical frameworks like the TSM test."'
In another sense, however, the Supreme Court is very distant from district
courts. Unlike district judges, Justices of the Supreme Court do not manage
complicated factfinding.42 o The Justices rarely struggle with construing claims
and determining prosecution history estoppel, nonobviousness, or the
appropriateness of injunctive relief. Furthermore, the Court may be somewhat
shielded from the most complex inventions; one criterion for seeking Supreme
Court review of patent cases is that the underlying technologies are relatively
simple."'1 As such, while injecting seemingly "commonsense" standards into
patent law, the Supreme Court is significantly insulated from having to apply
them in more complicated settings.
This situation represents a perfect storm for producing "costly" Supreme
Court patent law. The generalist Court approaches technology as a neophyte,
and it establishes broad standards in patent law. While these standards may
have commonsense appeal, they create high information costs for those who
must apply them. However, the Court, because of its limited docket, is largely
insulated from these costs.
On a related note, the Court's relative insulation from patent law, as well as
its generalist outlook, has made it skeptical of patent "exceptionalism." Earlier,
we saw that the Federal Circuit's traditional, bright-line approach to
infringement remedies reduced technological engagement by courts. However,
in eBay, the Supreme Court clarified that the same equitable standards apply to
injunctions in patent cases as in any other type of dispute.422 Nowhere in the
opinion did the Court acknowledge the higher information costs that this
framework would produce in the patent context. Rather, the Court was more
could contribute to the important ongoing debate, among both specialists and generalists, as
to whether the patent system . . . adequately reflects the 'careful balance' that 'the federal
patent laws . . . embod[y]."' (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 146 (1989))).
419. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
420. Cf Duffy, supra note 15, at 329 ("[P]atent cases . .. are likely to involve a great amount of
technological detail that the Court is ill-suited to evaluate.").
421. Cf Brief of Twenty-Four Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 15, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350), available
at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/ksramicus.pdf (stating that KSR is "an excellent
vehicle" because, among other reasons, it "involves simple technologies").
422. Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn, supra note 15, at 795; Wendy R. Stein, The
Supreme Court eBay Decision: Eliminating Special Rules in Patent Cases, INTELL. PROP. TODAY,
Oct. 20o6, at 18.
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interested in conforming patent law to broader legal doctrines and
principles.423
The Federal Circuit, which manages patent law on an everyday level, offers
an illuminating contrast. The Federal Circuit's proximity to everyday litigation
provides it with a deeper appreciation of technological complexity as well as the
information costs of patent adjudication. For example, the Federal Circuit's
concerns over "workability" led to its short-lived "complete bar" approach to
prosecution history estoppel.4 ' Furthermore, as noted, former Chief Judge
Paul Michel has argued against patent damages reforms that would compel
courts to perform difficult valuations of new technologies. 425 Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit's appreciation for the demands of patent adjudication informs
its formalistic, inquiry-truncating doctrine.426 Thus, the cultural orientations of
the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, one based on specialization and the
other based on generalism, help explain their respective methodological
preferences for formalism and holism.
This methodological divergence, however, also arises from other causes
and offers a window into the differing characters of generalist and specialized
courts. Throughout this Article, I have referred to the Supreme Court's holistic
turn to accentuate the Court's recent interventions in patent law. As I have
indicated, however, the Supreme Court has favored holistic standards on
several prominent occasions in its long history of patent adjudication.2 In
some ways, this preference reflects yet another strategy for avoiding (or, more
precisely, delegating) information costs; rather than clearly defining, limiting,
and guiding patent doctrine, the Supreme Court announces nebulous
standards that impose high information-cost externalities on others.
423. Cf MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (applying the same standards
that govern declaratory actions in non-patent cases to patent cases).
424. Festo VI, 234 F- 3 d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Wagner, supra
note 165, at 238 (noting that the Federal Circuit is uniquely well positioned to evaluate the
effectiveness of patent doctrines).
425. Michel Letter, supra note 397.
426. As noted, while such formalistic doctrine may be easier to apply, it may lead to poor
outcomes in terms of accuracy. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
427. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (establishing a broad standard for
evaluating nonobviousness); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,
609 (1950) (disavowing a formalistic approach to the doctrine of equivalents); Winans v.
Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1854) (recognizing that the scope of a patentee's exclusive
rights exceeds the patent's literal claims). I make no claim that the Supreme Court has
categorically preferred holism throughout its engagements with patent law; it may very well
be the case that the Court's methodological preferences have changed over time. I leave
these questions for future inquiries.
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However, holistic standards serve other, more laudable objectives that also
reflect the Court's generalist outlook. For example, Supreme Court standards
facilitate a purposive, policy-oriented approach to resolving patent disputes.""
In contradistinction to Federal Circuit formalism, discretionary standards
encourage judges to consider context and implications in deciding patent
cases;49 in some sense, this flexible approach better resonates with the
instrumentalist character of the patent system. 430 Furthermore, Supreme Court
standards also reflect an attempt to harmonize this specialized area of law with
transcendent legal principles. This holistic, "big picture" approach reflects both
the Supreme Court's generalist character as well as its position at the top of the
judicial hierarchy.431
On the other hand, a quasi-specialized court such as the Federal Circuit
takes a much narrower, more technical approach to its subject. 43  It is
concerned less with big-picture coherence and more with everyday practicality;
hence it emphasizes inquiry-truncating formalistic rules. Furthermore, such a
specialized court is more likely to appreciate the singularity of its subject, thus
trending toward doctrinal exceptionalism. The result is bright-line, specialized
rules that limit judicial discretion and admit fewer contextual factors.
Of course, in applying the Two Cultures thesis to the Federal Circuit and
the Supreme Court, one must acknowledge that this thesis is itself a
simplifying heuristic that can obscure as well as illuminate. As Snow himself
observed, "Attempts to divide anything into two ought to be regarded with
much suspicion."a4  As noted earlier, there is substantial internal heterogeneity
within both the Federal Circuit43 4 and the Supreme Court;43 s neither court
speaks with one voice.
428. See, e.g., Festo VIII, 535 U.S. 722, 737-38 (2002).
429. Cf Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) ("In the course of applying the machine-or-
transformation test to emerging technologies, courts may pose questions of such intricacy
and refinement that they risk obscuring the larger object of securing patents for valuable
inventions without transgressing the public domain.").
430. See Rai, supra note 15, at 1040; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the
power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
431. See Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn, supra note 15, at 795 ("[The Federal
Circuit] has little chance to see how patents fit into the economy as a whole. The Supreme
Court does have that perspective.").
432. Cf David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 860, 86o (1999)
(noting the traditionally formalistic nature of tax law, a highly technical field).
433. SNow, supra note 7, at 9.
434. See supra note 155.
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Furthermore, culture is fluid, and the dynamic described here is not static.
In particular, there are signs that the Federal Circuit is responding in kind to
the Supreme Court's holistic turn. For example, in In re Kubin, the Federal
Circuit drew from the Supreme Court's decision in KSR to affirm that the
status of a combination as being "obvious to try" may, in some cases, render it
obvious."' In announcing its new rule, the Federal Circuit stated, "The
Supreme Court's admonition against a formalistic approach to obviousness in
this context actually resurrects this court's own wisdom [from earlier case
law]."4' The Federal Circuit has also responded in kind to the Supreme
Court's program of narrowing the power conferred by patents. Recently, in
several prominent cases, the court has scrutinized and reversed large damages
awards arising from patent infringement.43' Tellingly, these developments
suggest a heightened role to be played by district judges in managing and
reviewing damages calculations, thus increasing their cognitive demands.
More substantively, one sees some indication of a "holistic turn" in the
Federal Circuit's approach to patentable subject matter. In In re Bilski, 439 the
Federal Circuit overruled previous doctrine establishing an expansive, relatively
bright-line approach to the patentability of processes.44o Instead, the Federal
Circuit announced the machine-or-transformation test to guide patent
eligibility. While even the name of the machine-or-transformation test smacks
of bright-line rules and formalism, the Federal Circuit's decision was arguably
more holistic than earlier precedent that essentially equated patentable subject
matter with utility." Relative to that earlier precedent, Bilski demanded
deeper, more holistic examinations of inventions.
As we have seen, however, the Supreme Court recently expressed disfavor
with Bilski; in so doing, it has embraced an even more holistic approach to
435. Compare eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394-95 (2006) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (emphasizing the historical practice of granting injunctions in most patent
cases), with id. at 395-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (highlighting the emergence of new
types of patents and patent practice for which injunctive relief may be inappropriate).
436. 561 F. 3 d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cit. 2009).
437. Id.; see KSR Ruling Guides Application of 'Obvious To Try' Test to Biotech Claim, 77 U.S.L.W.
1634, 1634 (2009).
438. ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 86o (Fed. Cir. 2010); Lucent Techs., Inc. v.
Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
439. In re Bilski, 545 F-3d 943 (Fed. Cit. 2008) (en banc).
440. 545 F.3 d at 960-61; see AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In
re Alappat, 33 F-3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
441. State Street, 149 F. 3 d 1368.
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patentable subject matter. In Bilski v. Kappos, the Court rejected the machine-
or-transformation test as the exclusive test for the patentability of processes,
relying instead on the more holistic "abstract idea" line of doctrine to deny the
patentability of the invention at issue." The day after the Court issued its
opinion, it granted the petition for a writ of certiorari in Mayo Collaborative
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., vacated the judgment, and remanded to
the Federal Circuit to further evaluate the case in light of the Court's new
guidance in Bilski." The Federal Circuit will now reconsider this important
case addressing the patentability of a method for optimizing drug dosages, and
it remains to be seen if it will respond in kind to the Supreme Court's holistic
overtures. Although reflecting two divergent cultures, the Federal Circuit and
the Supreme Court are locked in dialogue,' and cultural orientations may
shift over time.
CONCLUSION
Patent law represents a fascinating intersection of two traditionally
divergent cultures: law and science."" This Article has used the trope of the
Two Cultures to examine the difficulties inherent in generalist judges
adjudicating technologically complex patent cases. Judges express significant
anxiety over their ability to understand new technologies, and empirical
evidence confirms that these anxieties are well founded. The challenge of
bridging the Two Cultures has elicited a number of policy responses, from
selecting scientifically trained judges to establishing specialized courts. This
Article, however, reveals the significant role of doctrine in mitigating the
burdens of technologically intensive adjudication.
442. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). Arguing before the Supreme Court, counsel for
Bilski encouraged the Court to continue its inclination to overturn "rigid and narrow" tests
created by the Federal Circuit. See Tony Dutra & Anandashankar Mazumdar, Justices Hear
Oral Argument on Patentability ofBusiness Methods, 78 U.S.L.W. 3282, 3282 (2009).
443- 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010). Mayo also concerns the question of whether a claimed process-in
this case, a method for optimizing the dosing of a drug- constitutes patentable subject
matter. Id.
444. See Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn, supra note 15, at 794 ("Sharing their
views - learning from one another -could enhance the operation of the patent system, shed
light on the costs and benefits of specialization, ease the path for other specialized courts,
and improve judicial administration more generally."). The dialogue metaphor is a popular
one for describing the relationship of these two courts. See, e.g., Castanias et al., supra note
223; Law Professor calls for 'Dialogue,' supra note 367.
445. See Hultberg, supra note 11, at 197-98.
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In pursuing this theme, this Article has explored the psychology of
technological engagement. This literature reveals that technology can impose
significant burdens on laypeople, who employ a variety of mechanisms to
mitigate them. In particular, consistent with a "cognitive miser" model of
information processing, nonexperts commonly adopt simplifying heuristics
and defer to technical expertise when confronting unfamiliar technologies.
Drawing from these psychological principles, this Article has presented an
information-cost theory of patent doctrine. It argues that the formalistic nature
of Federal Circuit jurisprudence mitigates technological engagement by
generalist judges. In particular, the inquiry-truncating nature of formalism
limits the universe of technological facts that judges must consider in deciding
patent issues.
However, the Supreme Court's recent forays into patent law push against
this formalistic trend. While the Court's narrowing of substantive patent rights
is indeed significant, this Article highlights the Court's underappreciated
methodological shift. In a variety of doctrinal areas, the Supreme Court is
consistently favoring holistic standards over bright-line, formalistic rules. This
"holistic turn," while injecting valuable flexibility into patent adjudication,
threatens to increase cognitive demands on generalist judges. From an
economic perspective, Supreme Court patent standards impose information-
cost externalities on lower court adjudicators. To help internalize these
externalities, this Article seeks to apply enablement principles to Supreme
Court patent decisions. By encouraging Supreme Court Justices to consider
and illustrate myriad applications of new patent doctrine, an enablement
orientation would help produce doctrine that is clearer and more accessible to
persons of ordinary skill in legal arts.
This inquiry holds several broader implications. In a general sense, it
argues for exploiting the psychology and sociology of science as scholarly
resources for understanding and improving the patent system. Additionally, it
sheds new light on formalism, which plays a surprising role in mediating the
intersection of lay judges and technological subject matter. Finally, this Article
has explored the institutional bases for the methodological divergence of the
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court. In substantial part, the Federal
Circuit's preference for formalism relates to its specialized nature, while the
Supreme Court's generalist outlook informs its preference for holistic
standards. These seminal institutions have important and differing approaches
to patent law, and the most fruitful engagements between law and technology
may require blending aspects of both.
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